Summary

The "international community" showed an apparent unanimously to ratify the prohibitionist approach on drug control in the 1998 Special Session of the General Assembly (UNGASS, an acronym in English) on drugs. But the truth is that there is a long conflict within UN facing the nations who wish to maintain the regime of prohibition and aspiring to adopt a more pragmatic approach. The complexity and the course of this conflict can be traced through the thousands of documents and proceedings published by the UN to reveal the unwritten history of the events leading up to the UNGASS. They revealed how far they have come the hard-line supporters to maintain the status quo, using rhetoric, denial, manipulation, selective presentation, misrepresentation and suppression of evidence, selective use of experts, threats on the allocation of funds and purging "defeatists" of the UN system. The UN is committed to achieving a drug free world by 2008, although the problem gets worse at higher speed than the remedy used needs to fix it. However, some advocates of reform and pragmatics have been challenging the system through their national policies. That may encourage adoption of a more realistic approach to illicit drugs and help establish a more rational organization of the control system of the UN drug.

• Drugs in the UN system: the unwritten history of the 1998 United Nations General Assembly Special Session on drugs, by Martin Jelsma (TNI) in the Special Issue on the UNGASS Mid-term Review of the International Journal of Drug Policy April 2003 (Volume 14 , Issue 2)

Introduction

Kofi Annan proposed a toast at the 20th Special Session of the General Assembly (UNGASS, an acronym in English) on the global problem of drugs, took place between 8 and June 10, 1998: "Excellencies, friends, let me win the cup with the hope that when us recall this meeting, we do because it was the moment our challenges turned on the testimony of our commitment. The time we committed to cooperate to become a family of free nations drugs in the XXI century ". Just days before the meeting, Mr. Annan's speech videotaped collecting the following words: "Our commitment is to achieve real results in the elimination of drug crops by 2008. I hope that this session will go down in history as the moment when the international community reached consensus needed to undertake this business seriously. " President of the Special Session, Mr. Udovenko (Ukraine), opened the meeting saying: "The drug problem can not be disguised with good intentions and the international community must be prepared for a long, hard battle." And, at the close of the summit, stressed the need for "greater convergence of views" and a "spirit of unity." He also expressed his hope that the session "go down in history as a watershed event" and in conclusion he added: "We have a good strategy and a series of measures and targets to be met within a specified period" ( A/S-20/PV.1-9).

The international community is about to review this event by mid-UNGASS period to be held between 16 and 17 April in Vienna. At present, one wonders if, five years later, we confirm the optimism of Annan and Udovenko as a "watershed event"? Can we raise our glasses to celebrate the "real results"? What was the scope of "consensus" point? Will they meet the delegates in April 2003 with the same "spirit of unity"? This article reconstructs the unwritten history of the UNGASS 1988 and the tremendous effort of justifying the current debate about drugs in the United Nations system.

A busy decade: 1991-2000

In 1987 in Vienna International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking. In 1988 he adopted the Vienna Convention against Illicit Traffic. In 1990, the General Assembly held its first Special Session of the problem of drugs approved a Global Programme of Action and announced that the period 1991-2000 was to become the United Nations Decade against Drug Abuse. In 1991, he created a program of the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP). Thus was set the stage for the UN for a new era of action against drugs.

The Decade Against Drug Abuse certainly became one of the busiest time for managers and policy makers on drug worldwide. The first major step was the convening of a three-day meeting of the highest levels of the 1993 General Assembly to "examine urgently the situation of international cooperation" in the field of drug control. It was hoped that the "Berlin Wall" and the end of ideological confrontation facilitate the search for common ground and enhance international collaboration. In the opening speech of the meeting, its chairman said that the victory of the international community about the misuse of drugs "would be the litmus test to demonstrate their ability to respond to the issues raised after the end of the Cold War" . But, was the international community to move from words to action in his comprehensive campaign against illegal drugs? In the opinion of the president, the answer to this question would show whether countries could "cooperate in harmony for the common good" (A/48/PV.37).

This harmony, however, would be broken by the still existing dichotomy between North and South and by the European experiments for harm reduction, two facts that cast doubt on the validity of the control framework of existing drugs.

The Mexican voice

It was a letter from Mexico addressed to the Secretary General of the UN that set the tone for the 1993 meeting. It detailed a number of key points. Because, despite the efforts, consumption was increasing and criminal organizations flourished and spread, Mexico raised the event as a unique opportunity for international reflection, at the time, and because of the severity of the situation had become imperative. Mexico requested that more attention be given to the demand for "drug use is the driving force of production and traffic of the same, the reduction in demand is revealed as a radical solution - although in the long term - the problem" . Also opined that "the most effective way to bring down the production and trafficking of narcotics is the gradual reduction of both current customers as of the possible". It is clear that this letter contained a strong indictment against the anti-drug operations conducted by the United States in Mexico and the mechanism of drug unilateral U.S. certification. The letter noted that for the united front against addiction and drug trafficking to gain ground, required good faith, principles of legality, political will, ability to work together, recognizing the identity of each nation and unconditional respect for their sovereign rights. He also decried the "hegemonic impositions", the "politics of blame" and "guilt by pointing out geographical Manichaeism schemes that solve nothing" (A/C.3/48/2).

Mexico also stressed the need to review the classification of drugs according to the criteria of the World Health Organization (WHO) "to reduce the illicit drug market", which hinted that he considered the control of certain substances was abandoned. The letter specified the issues to be considered with greater urgency to the idea of "balanced approach" being taken seriously. Most of these issues appear, five years later in the agenda of the UNGASS: demand reduction, money laundering, chemical precursors, synthetic drugs and increased investment in alternative development.

An inherent imbalance

Mexico's letter reflected the tensions between the U.S. and Latin America on drugs, as well as the traditional division between demand and supply in the system of international drug control. Both events resulted from the imbalance in political power relations in the shadow of that negotiated the three conventions. The 1961 Convention focused on the "drug" and was conceived largely as a tool for control of coca / cocaine, opium / heroin and cannabis. The main objective is aimed to drugs extracted from plants whose cultivation, at the time, was widespread in the South with a long tradition of using raw materials derived from such plants. The classification of the various plants and their products (no chemical precursors used for processing) listings stricter control was not conducted according to scientific studies, but based on the idea that all drugs are dangerous until proven so Otherwise (Sinha, 2001: 26). However, during the negotiations of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971, centered on the substances produced synthetically by the pharmaceutical industry in the North, the charges took a 180 degree turn and "unless there was evidence of the danger of a given substance, it should not be penalized "(Sinha, 2001: 27). The Convention on Illicit Traffic of 1988 required the signatories to criminalize all aspects of illicit drug trafficking, cultivation, manufacture, distribution, sale, possession, money laundering, etc.. and "ensure that the courts or authorities of each State would treat such illegal activities as felonies" (E/CN.7/590: 48).

The penalty mandatory drug possession for personal consumption established by the Vienna Convention of 1988 was the first intrusion - very controversial, for sure - the idea that demand management was a matter of law depended each country. The control system set up by the convention was intended to end the illicit supply, while demand-side policies were seen as a national issue. When raised the possibility of a fourth convention specifically aimed at reducing demand, the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) was against the idea because he doubted that it could adopt a binding international treaty on reducing or demand that the treaty was the appropriate instrument to address the issue. The Board felt that reducing the demand was made to be played by each country independently, although in some cases need international support. It also considered that "programs to reduce demand should be developed at national and local levels, according to the actual situation of drug abuse and taking into account the cultural, political, economic and legal". (E/INCB/1994/1/Sup.1: 6).

The prohibition in question

In fact, Mexico expressed the frustration shared by many Latin American producing countries the imbalance inherent in the international system of drug control. So what should counter was precisely this imbalance. In addition to this imbalance, the international community realized that the control measures had proved ineffective drugs, which questioned the concept that was based prohibitionist system. The INCB report for 1992 was another document that had a notable influence during the period preceding the 1993 General Assembly. In this, the Board included first extensive comments on the legalization debate raised by concluding that the Dutch policy on cannabis violated the principles of the conventions (Polak, 1994). The Commission on Narcotic Drugs had also devoted part of its 1993 session to discuss the report of the INCB and the Board agreed that any attempt to legalize non-medical use of drugs undermine the international drug control and, therefore jeopardize the implementation of existing international treaties in this field. And, in the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, these treaties "are the backbone of the system" (E/1993/29: párr.44).

The then executive director of the UNDCP, Giorgio Giacomelli, read a statement on behalf of the Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to the 1993 General Assembly which called on member states to keep two questions: "First, the speed extending the scourge, with all its consequences on society and crime, on the other, the fact that civil society shows a growing impatience that leads to simplistic or defeatist solutions take. We need more than ever, determined action worldwide "(A/48/PV.37: 4). The appearance of another apparent disagreement was already in sight.

A system with teeth

The disagreement became more and more apparent over the next three days, during which several delegates stressed the need to "reaffirm the commitment," "strengthen" and "strengthen" the existing system. As the delegate of the United Kingdom, Mr. Richardson:

"We have the mechanism. What we must do now is to improve its operation. In particular, we need a more united international front to defend the United Nations Convention of 1988. The convention is an instrument with teeth, and we make it bite. "Thus, any position to question the effectiveness of existing legislation was seen as" defeatism "or" waiver "."

Mr. Bengt Westerberg of Sweden was expressed as follows:

"We detect illicit drugs increased in all areas: farming, processing, trafficking and consumption. Some people are abandoning the fight alleging that the drug problem is insoluble. In reality, they mean that could not solve the problem within the framework of existing legislation. (...) We must not give up and accept the cowardly policy advocating the legalization supporters. "

Mr. Antonino murmurs, the Assistant Secretary of State of Italy, shared this view:

"I must express my concern about the growing trend in favor of legalizing drugs and the fatalistic attitude that considers the war on drugs is a" lost cause ". I consider this kind of position could pose a danger it would weaken our commitment against drug trafficking. (...) At present, therefore, we must not lose heart and withdraw our commitment, but to renew and assert our determination to win this war. "

The start of the debate

However, other delegates used terms such as "review", "general assessment", "try new strategies" and "rethink our actions." It is true that none of them advocated legalization, but many advocated a more lenient approach to consumption, for example, Mr. Torben Lund, Denmark's minister of health, saying: "I think we have reached a point where we understand that new approaches are needed to address the drug problem. (...) Perhaps we should stop focusing on the application of the law and deal instead of prevention and treatment. "

Mr. Baltasar Garzon Real also stressed the need to initiate an objective debate. The judge reached after an internationally renowned for its legal battles against the death squads in Spain antivascos (GAL), the Galician drug cartels, the Chilean dictator Pinochet and Batasuna, a political party linked to ETA. In 1993, Mr. Garzón acted as representative of the National Drug Plan of Spain and declared:

"It is time to pause and reflect on the solutions to be adopted. I have the intention to recommend in my country the beginning of a general discussion to assess the achievements and reflect on the future. To address a debate of this nature, we must get rid of all preconceived opinions and dogmas unbreakable. We must be open to the exchange of ideas. It is desirable that the United Nations followed a similar thought process into it and foster it beyond its doors. This proposal is the result of the conviction that the United Nations is the ideal forum and better dissemination tool to exchange ideas and where decisions on new guidelines to help us achieve our goals. "

Arguably, therefore, that 1993 was the year of the "come-out" of the European trend - which also joined Australia and Canada - which is already firmly established under the banner of harm reduction. The debate ended on October 28, 1993 with the adoption of resolution 48/12 a draft of which was provided by Mexico. As stipulated by the resolution, the General Assembly would request the Commission on Narcotic Drugs to monitor and assess the functioning of international instruments and national drug control to identify areas in which they had made good progress and weaknesses. Also recommend to the Economic and Social Council in its series of high-level segment of 1995 "changes to be made ​​in drug control activities." Finally, consider the possibility of appointing a panel of experts as an additional tool to examine the issues involved and to make "concrete recommendations for action" (A/RES/48/12, art. 9 and 11).

Then came several initiatives, but their path clearly defined political boundaries in search of "appropriate adjustments" in the drug control system. Peru and Bolivia renewed diplomatic efforts to defend the traditional use of coca in their countries. WHO continued to try to gain ground in favor of the philosophy of harm reduction in the UN system and initiated several scientific studies. They began to raise the need to revise the classification established in the conventions on the products of coca and cannabis. Proposals were presented to analyze the cost and benefits of harm reduction and decriminalization strategies. And in 1984, Mexico began to muster the support needed to hold an international summit dedicated to the reflection that ultimately led to the 1998 UNGASS.

The opinion of the INCB on cannabis and coca

As a complement to the resolution adopted by the General Assembly, UNDCP appointed a special advisory group and intergovernmental whose aim was to make recommendations on the "changes to be made." This group had the advice of Mr. Hamid Ghodse, INCB President on the effectiveness of international treaties on drug control (E/CN.7/1995/14). In a detailed valuation report submitted by Mr. Ghodse, the INCB stated: "Right now, it seems necessary to introduce major changes in international treaties on drug control. It takes only a few technical adjustments to update some of its provisions "and some" defects should be eliminated "(E/INCB/1994/1: par. 21, b, c).

Since "have used modern agricultural technologies and more sophisticated to develop new varieties of high-potency cannabis," the INCB stated: "... the classification of cannabis products in the 1961 Convention, namely, cannabis and cannabis resin, is obsolete and leads to confusion. For example, the coca leaf is not contained in this Convention, despite its content of THC. Accordingly, the Board recommends that consideration be given to strengthen the Articles of the 1961 Convention on the control of cannabis taking into account the current and expanding the control of, among others, the coca leaf, which in many cases contains more THC than cannabis resin. To do this, it may be necessary to weigh the reclassification of cannabis plant and derived products in the 1961 Convention to ensure that there is a correlation between the power plant and its products "(E/INCB/1994 / 1/Sup.1: 10/11).

In the case of the coca leaf, the Board noted that "the need to clarify ambiguities." One of the goals it had set the 1961 Convention, which entered into force in December 1964 had been "abolished" the chewing of coca leaf in a period of 25 years, ie 1989. La Convención establecía también fechas límite para otras substancias derivadas de plantas que nunca se cumplieron: “ el uso del opio para fines casi médicos deberá ser abolido en un plazo de 15 años ” y “ el uso de la cannabis para fines que no sean médicos y científicos deberá cesar lo antes posible, pero en todo caso dentro de un plazo de 25 años ” (Convención, 1961: art. 49). Es evidente que no se ha alcanzado ninguno de estos objetivos. Por otro lado, la JIFE alegó que existía un error en el texto del tratado porque no preveía un uso no médico de la hoja de coca: el consumo de té de coca o mate de coca.

“ Así, el mate de coca, considerado inocuo y legal en diversos países de América del Sur, forma parte de una actividad ilegal según lo estipulado en la Convención de 1961 y en la Convención de 1988, aunque no era esa la intención de las conferencias plenipotenciarias en que se adoptaron dichas convenciones ” (E/INCB/1994/1/Supp. 1: 11).

La Junta solicitó que se revisara la manera en que la Convención de 1961 permitía de manera temporal este uso tradicional de la coca y pidió que la OMS realizara un examen científico sobre los valores y los riesgos relacionados con la masticación de la coca y el mate de coca. A tenor de sus declaraciones, parecía estar bastante convencida de los resultados de dicho examen: “ La Junta confía en que la Comisión de Estupefacientes, partiendo de estudios científicos, aclare este tipo de ambigüedades que han estado minando las convenciones durante largo tiempo ” (E/ INCB/1994/1/Supp. 1: 11).

El grupo consultivo

Los diez integrantes del grupo consultivo especial se seleccionaron con sumo cuidado. México estuvo representado por Miguel Ruiz-Cabañas, que en aquel momento trabajaba en la embajada mexicana de Washington y que más tarde se hizo cargo del departamento antidroga del ministerio de asuntos exteriores de su país. El grupo incluía también a los Estados Unidos, la India, la Argentina, la Federación de Rusia, Suecia, Polonia, Japón, Egipto y Nigeria. El representante de éste último país fue Philip O. Emafo, que en aquellos momentos era consultor del PNUFID y que más tarde pasó a ocupar la presidencia de la JIFE. No se invitó a ninguno de los países conocidos por sus concepciones más liberales. El grupo se reunió en dos ocasiones durante la segunda mitad de 1994 en Viena. Además de respaldar la filosofía de la JIFE, elogió su informe de 1992 que, en opinión del grupo, proporcionaba sólidos argumentos “ para contrarrestar el fuerte movimiento que pretende demostrar que el régimen internacional de fiscalización de drogas, fundamentado en la aplicación de tratados internacionales en esta materia, había fracasado y que la única solución pasaba por la legalización ” (UNDCP/1994/AG.7: párr.5). Uno de los miembros exigió incluso que se intentara poner freno a la idea de la “ reducción del daño ”, ya que se consideraba una fuente importante de las posturas enfrentadas. “La reducción del daño se consideraba el caballo de Troya de las facciones que defendían la causa de la legalización” (UNDCP/1994/AG.7: párr.60).

No obstante, “ un estudio más detallado sobre las implicaciones de la despenalización y de las campañas para la reducción del daño, tal como sugirió el grupo consultivo, podría ofrecer nuevas perspectivas que condujeran a soluciones insospechadas ” (E/CN.7/1995/14: párr.45). En el informe dirigido a la Comisión de Estupefacientes, en que se entretejían las sugerencias de la JIFE y del grupo consultivo, el director ejecutivo recomendaba la adopción de un doble enfoque. En primer lugar, el PNUFID debía proporcionar “ argumentos concretos y sólidos contra la legalización del uso de estupefacientes con fines no terapéuticos ” y colaborar con la OMS en la preparación de informes sobre las consecuencias para la salud, tanto físicas como psíquicas, provocadas por el uso indebido de drogas especialmente peligrosas. En segundo, el PNUFID debía “ emprender un estudio sobre las implicaciones de la despenalización y de las campañas para la reducción del daño ” en los países que ya habían adoptado este tipo de políticas. La Comisión se encargaría entonces de dar una orientación sobre las siguientes medidas que debían tomarse (E/CN.7/1995/14: párr.52).

El grupo consultivo secundaba la idea de convocar una segunda Conferencia Internacional sobre el Uso Indebido y el Tráfico Ilícito de Drogas como la de 1987. “ Dicha conferencia ofrecería la posibilidad de, entre otros, valorar los éxitos gubernamentales en materia de fiscalización del uso indebido de drogas y adoptar una declaración de principios sobre la reducción de la demanda. Se consideraba que la conferencia sería el foro adecuado donde se podrían reunir los gobiernos y el PNUFID para reafirmar los principios y las posturas sobre la legalización, la despenalización, la reducción del daño y otras cuestiones importantes ” (UNDCP/1994/AG.7: párr.79). El Sr. Giorgio Giacomelli, director ejecutivo del PNUFID, reflejó esta recomendación en su informe a la Comisión de Estupefacientes puntualizando que el evento no debía limitarse únicamente a “ reafirmar ” sino también a “ estudiar ” dichas posturas (E/CN.7/1995/14: párr.35).

El grupo reconoció que las estrategias de reducción de la demanda serían convenientes “ en el marco de un sistema sanitario público que abarque otras substancias nocivas, incluidos los disolventes volátiles, los esteroides anabólicos, el alcohol y el tabaco ”. Rememoraron un discurso pronunciado por el Sr. Giacomelli durante la apertura de la sesión de la Comisión de Estupefacientes en 1994 en que éste señalaba que era

“… cada vez más difícil justificar la continua distinción entre substancias teniendo sólo en cuenta su situación legal o su aceptación social. En la medida en que la adicción a la nicotina, el alcoholismo y el uso indebido de disolventes e inhalantes pueden representar una mayor amenaza para la salud que el abuso de otras substancias sometidas actualmente a la fiscalización internacional, el pragmatismo llevaría a concluir que seguir con estrategias disparatadas para minimizar su impacto es, en última instancia, una medida artificial, irracional y poco rentable ” (UNDCP, 1994).

The advisory group agreed with the INCB that should correct those points of the conventions that considered weak or contradictory. This led to the executive director to point out that, to carry out this mission, you could use a simplified method and integrated into the conventions. This method allows any signatory to the convention an amendment with the Secretary General of the UN that will be disseminated to other signatories. In the event that, after 18 months, no country this objection, the amendment takes effect automatically (E/CN.7/1995/14: par.13). However, he believed that this procedure would not work with the suggested proposals. Therefore recommended that the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, along with the INCB, UNDCP requested to appoint a "panel of experts to study the validity of existing definitions in the Conventions of 1961 and 1971, with special attention to several products of cannabis and coca leaf "(E/CN.7/1995/14: párr.46c). UNDCP also suggested that the establishment of a forum, a panel or a working group to oversee progress and to assess the effectiveness of alternative development programs.

Then they invited the member states of the Narcotics Board to comment in writing on such recommendations. The comments were summarized in a second report from the Executive Director of the CND a year later (E/CN.7/1996/3). Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, the United Kingdom and South Africa were the countries that submitted their written responses. Peru is estimated that "it was necessary to reexamine the traditional ways of addressing the issue of drug control" and that, therefore, an international conference "should be oriented towards the future and promote innovative solutions instead of being overly influenced by traditional ways of addressing the problem. " Peru and South Africa endorsed the proposal to form an expert group on coca and cannabis and a similar forum to evaluate alternative development programs. South Africa and Australia supported the idea of conducting a study on the impact of decriminalization and harm reduction policies, with the condition, as expressed by Australia, that if such programs were valued nature also "had to assess other program models control of drug abuse, and that they should do any evaluation of these programs, including those based on the containment of damage, should be balanced and impartial. " Regarding the second part of the double plan, intended to facilitate "concrete and grounded arguments against legalization," Australia felt that if the study was done, "should be fair and address the arguments for and against legalization, so I could place a balanced and open discussion. " The second report called on the Commission on Narcotic Drugs at its next meeting to decide whether UNDCP should appoint an expert group to work on alternative development, another on the status of "various products of cannabis and coca leaf "and if you should study the idea of legalization," taking into account the arguments of proponents and opponents of such legalization. "

Last stop: Commission on Narcotic Drugs 1995/1996

According to Robin Room, who analyzed the general debate held during the session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs in 1995: "The most prominent dissident dominant rhetoric must find it in the Netherlands. This country has assumed within the CND a role that could be compared to the young of the story about the emperor's new clothes: the character's sincere. " As an example, cites the Dutch representative Room when he says: "The whole situation could be defined in terms of 'criminogenic tremendous multiplier effects' (...) With the implementation of the 1988 Convention will deepen our knowledge. But not abate the storm "(Room, 1999). While most delegates agreed that the situation worsened every year, few dared to attribute the problem to errors of strategy or challenge conventions and defend the need for alternative approaches. The dominant discourse advocated only by redoubling efforts and enhance cooperation: "The situation is daunting but must give way to concerted action and not be a source of discouragement," said Norwegian delegate. Uruguay warned of the danger of the mere expression of dissenting views, "We feel a deep concern for the opinions they have expressed in favor of drug liberalization. (...) The United Nations should use its privileged position and show a clear attitude. Any doubt, hesitation or undue review of the validity of the objectives to be achieved would undermine our commitment. (...) Our goals are so noble and inflexible. And never succeed if there are discordant notes. We can not give in and we must stand firm on our goals "(Room, 1999).

However, the discordant notes kept ringing. Interpol, like the Netherlands, questioned the validity of the strategy to achieve the targets. Taking stock of the general debate of 1995, "I remember the title of the movie" Next year at the same time '. The years without the situation happen to experience a real improvement. (...) We hope that next year, unlike the latter, we can speak of real progress. " Australia continued to defend the need for more open debate: "In the time that some states are questioning the effectiveness of the treaties and points to simple solutions, such as legalization, we must contemplate the possibility of taking alternative measures of punishment and exchange impressions on the Commission. It should continue to explore alternative strategies. We do not advocate a particular change, but we limit ourselves to stating that we should not rule out new approaches that may not conform to the current paradigms. (...) The Commission on Narcotic Drugs should consider approaches as legitimate harm reduction and not reject them outright. " Bolivia said that "it was impossible to follow the same path" and requested to hold a world summit to "identify the causes of failure of this system of control" (Room, 1999).

In the next session, which was to take place in April 1996, the CND had to decide what to do with the recommendations of the advisory group and the INCB and the comments submitted by Member States. Proposals should have served to open the debate and pave the way for changes in the regime were discarded one by one:

"While there was some support for the convening of a meeting of a group of experts to examine the adequacy of current definitions of the 1961 Convention and the 1971 Convention, with particular reference to the various products of the cannabis and coca leaf, (...) expressed the view that there should be convened expert group meetings on other matters within the jurisdiction of the International Narcotics Control "(E/1996/27: Supp. 7, párr.16 .)

What, in other words, meant that there was going to review the status of cannabis and coca.

The possibility of studying the concept of decriminalization and harm reduction was hindered in another way:

"There was strong opposition to the legalization of drug use for non-therapeutic purposes. This measure would not only be contrary to the provisions of international treaties on drug control, but also represent a serious setback for international cooperation on drug control. "While there was some support for UNDCP realizase research on the issue of legalizing drug use for non-therapeutic purposes, it was noted that this research could be misinterpreted by proponents of legalization" (E/1996/27 : Supp. 7, párr.21).

This idea just "appeared" and was not adopted, but indicated that there was a consensus and, therefore, could not conduct the study.

Finally, it dismissed the proposal to organize an international conference as the 1987 which could have adopted amendments to conventions. As a reason would be argued that a "high cost" in a time when "the United Nations passed through the worst financial crisis since its founding. The Commission concluded that many of the goals of a conference could also be achieved by convening a special session of the General Assembly "(E/1996/27: Sup.7, para.18). In the United Nations system is frequently used for economic reasons to halt plans without the need to provide reasons on the grounds. The economic crisis which alluded derived largely from the fact that the United States had failed to pay their quota and owed ​​the UN trillion. Thus, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs adopted a resolution (E/CN.7/1996/L.16) which recommended the celebration of what became the 1998 UNGASS. Its aim was "a renewed commitment by governments to fight drug abuse and illicit drug trafficking and strengthen the implementation of the instrument of international drug control" (E/1996/27: Sup.7 , para.17). The content of the paper was full of reassurance and terms like "value", "studying", "scientific review", "identify weaknesses", "appropriate adjustments" or "new strategies" did not survive the session CND and, therefore, not reflected in the final resolution.

The high-level meeting of ECOSOC in 1996

Before you can present the results of the session before the General Assembly, they must go through the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the agency welcomes the Commission as one of its agencies. The ECOSOC devoted a segment of high-level three-day analysis of the results of the meeting of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (E/1996/SR.10-15). The president of the INCB, Mr. Schroeder made ​​it very clear his view during the opening session: "Governments should not forget that the experiments in the field of harm reduction are currently being conducted in several developed countries could be subject to misuse by those who advocate the legalization of drugs. (...) According to the Board, can not justify the legitimacy of drug use under the rubric of 'harm reduction'. "

But Australia was not intimidated by these statements. The Australian delegate said that harm reduction measures represented the key factor in the strategy of your country. These measures were beginning to be applied without being given the precondition for the elimination of drug abuse. While it was possible that such strategies will result not suitable for all countries, it was undeniable that had achieved very positive results in reducing the social, economic and health in Australia. The Special Session of the General Assembly scheduled for 1998 would provide "an excellent opportunity to determine whether improvements were needed in the structures set up to enhance their effectiveness in the battle of the international community against drugs."

The Netherlands defended their pragmatic approach to national cannabis. Given that the strategies were not so far neither realistic nor effective, the solution to the drug problem could only be found by learning from past mistakes. The Dutch government had addressed the issue from different points of view, many of them innovative, with some lasting results had been obtained. "Special attention was paid to reduce the use of hard drugs, because the damage they cause is much more severe than from the use of cannabis. By separating the market for soft drugs users of hard drugs, the number of cannabis users went on to hard drugs was extremely low. The basic principle of differentiate both markets proved very positive and the government did not initiate legal proceedings in cases of possession of small amounts of cannabis for personal consumption. "

Portugal declaró que los gobiernos debían estar abiertos al debate público para encontrar las soluciones apropiadas, sobre todo si existían dudas sobre la eficacia de ciertas medidas. The observer of Switzerland said that despite the enormous efforts devoted by the international community to combat the threat of the drug, they had achieved very poor results. "The international community should not give in to disappointment at the setbacks but take the opportunity to analyze strategies for the future criteria and also do it with an open mind who is willing to learn from the experience of others and experience when needed."

These views, however, were only exceptions. Overall, the meeting confirmed the predominant discourse. The ECOSOC gave its approval to the report of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, including the recommendation to hold a Special Session of the General Assembly in 1998. Subsequently, the UN Secretary General presented a report to the General Assembly on the possible outcomes of that meeting completely purged of any hint of review. "In the special session could reiterate the importance of treaties on international drug control (...) and confirm its relevance and effectiveness." It would also help "l ograr universal adherence to and implementation before the end of the millennium." Asimismo, los resultados de la sesión “ podrían llevar a los gobiernos a reafirmar la importancia política de la fiscalización de drogas ya renovar el compromiso ”. Finally, the discussions could lead to "globalization and harmonization of the various bilateral and regional approaches" (A/51/469). The preparations for the UNGASS 1998 were launched under the responsibility of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and its various Preparatory Committees in Vienna.

WHO: 'Six Horsemen ride'

Yet as described, there is still another episode in the history of drug control of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs that could not act. La Organización Mundial de la Salud ( OMS ) desempeña su propio papel en la formulación de políticas sobre drogas de la ONU y lo hace de una manera relativamente independiente del trío que conforma el núcleo del sistema de control de drogas y que está compuesto por el PNUFID, la JIFE y la Comisión de Estupefacientes. This role is limited to recommending which list the conventions of 1961 and 1971 certain substances should be classified attending to their health effects. Precisely for this purpose, WHO convened every two years an Expert Committee on Drug Dependence. WHO has always been at odds with the drug control system established, since it has never understood the logic behind the current distinction between licit and illicit substances. Since its mission is to look only at the impact on health, WHO usually refers to "drugs, including alcohol and snuff." The last two substances pose to the organization major headaches that illicit drugs classified lists of the drug control conventions. For example, according to its own statistics show, the set of all illicit drugs is responsible for the loss of 0.6% of "years of disability-adjusted life" (Disability-Adjusted Life Years, in English), compared to 6.1% caused by alcohol and snuff (WHO, 2001).

Cuando comenzó la Década contra el Uso Indebido de Drogas, en 1990, la OMS había creado un programa sobre abuso de substancias ( Programme on Substance Abuse o PSA, en inglés) y nombró a seis expertos de entre su personal para fortalecer la contribución de la OMS en este campo. The British Journal of Addiction welcomed the decision with an editorial entitled "Six Horsemen ride out: WHO is launching a new program on substance abuse." One of the columnists in the magazine celebrated the arrival of PSA "because you can now direct attention to correct the imbalance, far too inclined toward supply reduction and law enforcement, whose practitioners remember, by the force of his belief in the 'evil' of traffickers and of chemicals, one of those honest brokers of justice that condemned so many innocent women to death for witchcraft "(Haworth, 1991). He referred to the historical document entitled Discoverie of Witchcraft (Discovery of Witchcraft), published in 1584 in protest against the rising tide in the persecution of innocents by the superstitious clergy, a book that King James I of England condemned to the stake. Haworth attached great importance to the role of PSA to provide scientific data with which to add some sanity to the drug problem and that "I hope no one would wish to fire." Subsequent events indicate that Haworth was somewhat optimistic.

The enthusiastic PSA team decided to expand the work of the Expert Committee to cover a broader range of issues related to demand reduction. Thus, the 1992 Expert Committee met with two objectives. First, you should review the classification of ten substances and, on the other, we asked experts to study "the various strategies and approaches to reducing substance use and its harmful effects" (WHO, 1993: 1) .

After discussing the traditional practice of chewing coca in the Andes and the use of khat in Africa, the Committee "recommended that studies be conducted to analyze possible changes in the provisions of international control over these traditional patterns of use" (WHO, 1993: 20). En el informe del Comité también se concluía que el “ objetivo primordial de los programas nacionales para la reducción de la demanda debería ser minimizar el daño asociado al uso de alcohol, tabaco y otros estupefacientes. (…) El Comité recomendó que, para alcanzar una eficacia óptima, las políticas nacionales debían orientarse hacia objetivos explícitamente definidos de 'reducción del daño', tanto a corto como a largo plazo ” (WHO, 1993: 35-36). According to Robin Room, one of the experts who participated in the meeting, this conclusion was reached "not without some grumbling," referring to two other components of the Committee: Hamid Ghodse, who later became president of the INCB, and Philip O. Emafo, also a member of the aforementioned advisory group in 1994 and currently Chairman of the Board. Still, the end is pushed through the report, which "adopted relatively broad view regarding harm reduction as, for example, regulation of the supply was seen as one of the possible strategies to follow with this fi n" (Room 1997).

The Cocaine Project WHO

In 1992, PSA launched a project on cocaine and UNICRI WHO (WHO / UNICRI Cocaine Project, in English) which had funds from the Italian government and participating in a group of leading academic researchers. UNICRI is based in Italy and his initials are the abbreviation of the Institute United Nations Interregional Crime Research and Justice. The research projects were developed partly in response to the Ministerial Summit on Drugs, held in London in April 1990 with the aim of formulating policies to reduce demand and "combat the cocaine threat." Según un comunicado de prensa emitido por la OMS en marzo de 1995, el proyecto sobre cocaína fue el mayor estudio a escala mundial realizado hasta el momento sobre el uso de esta substancia. Information was collected from 22 cities and 19 countries on the use of cocaine and other derivatives of the coca leaf, its users, its effects on them and the community as well as on the response of governments to this problematic. Addressed all aspects of the problem from the chewing of coca leaves in the Andes to crack smokers in New York and Lagos, to users who inject cocaine in São Paulo and San Francisco or the sniff in Sydney and Cairo. El comunicado de prensa también aclaraba que “ las a veces imprevistas conclusiones del estudio no reflejan la posición oficial de la OMS ” (WHO, 1995).

At the meeting of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs in March 1995 released an information pack summarizing the results of the study (WHO / UNICRI, 1995). In it, could be found as the following conclusions:

Most participating countries agree that occasional use of cocaine does not necessarily lead to serious social problems or physical or mild. (…) En todos los países participantes, son mayores los problemas sanitarios derivados del uso de substancias legales, sobre todo del alcohol y del tabaco, que del uso de la cocaína. (…) El consumo de hojas de coca no parece provocar efectos negativos sobre la salud y, en cambio, posee una función terapéutica, ritual y social positiva en las comunidades indígenas andinas. (...) WHO / PSA should investigate the therapeutic effects of the coca leaf.

"Most authorities consider that the eradication of the use of cocaine and other drugs is an unrealistic goal. However, if the use of these substances is prolonged, the negative effects of such use need not be unavoidable. In most participating countries, a minority of the population that starts in the use of cocaine or related products, use them occasionally for a certain period of time and suffer the negative consequences for it are absent or mild even years after use. This suggests that it is possible to reduce if not eliminate, the harmful use of cocaine. "

“ El mayor interrogante que plantea el futuro es saber si las organizaciones internacionales, como la OMS y el PNUFID, así como los gobiernos nacionales, seguirán concentrándose en tomar medidas para la reducción de la oferta, como la destrucción y la substitución de cultivos y la imposición de la ley, ante la crítica y el cinismo crecientes acerca de la eficacia de estos enfoques. Countries such as Australia, Bolivia, Canada and Colombia are interested in studying a number of possibilities to legalize and decriminalize the use and personal possession of cocaine and related products. Should be evaluated in greater detail the negative effects of current policies and strategies and develop alternative approaches. (...) National and local approaches at this time, providing an over-emphasis on punitive control measures may actually contribute to the development of health-related problems. "

As the briefing began circulating through the halls of the UN, U.S. officials used their great influence to prevent the publication of the study. "The U.S. government has been surprised to note that the study seems to make the case for the positive use of cocaine," was the response from Neil Boyer, the representative of the United States in the 48 th session of the World Health Assembly in Geneva. Argued that the WHO program on substance abuse was "headed in the wrong direction" and "undermined the efforts of the international community to eradicate the illicit cultivation and production of coca." Denunció que existían “ indicios del apoyo de la OMS en programas para la reducción del daño y de colaboraciones previas de la OMS con organizaciones que defendían la legalización de las drogas “. Y, a continuación, amenazó expresamente con que “ si las actividades de la OMS en materia de drogas no consiguen reafirmar los enfoques probados para la fiscalización de drogas, se recortarán los fondos asignados a los programas correspondientes ” (WHA48/1995/REC/3).

Patricia Erickson, a professor at the University of Toronto who participated in the study as a researcher, defended the integrity of this:

"The original team consisted of a number of experts whose investigations into the cocaine had been scientifically proven, received funding, had been published and had passed the peer assessment by other scientists. Es decir, que se siguieron las normas habituales en estos casos. Of course, many of the results have completely contradicted the image of cocaine as a drug killer who enslaves people. This idea is typical of the mythology of the 20's. There is no denying that cocaine can cause problems and that is cause for concern, but concluded that people who work and engage in other activities could make it a recreational use. The study was not intended to give a bad image of cocaine, but delve into the full spectrum of use in various countries "(Taylor Martin, 2001).

The peer evaluation is a fundamental and usual procedures of any studies conducted or sponsored by WHO. In the 48 th session of the General Assembly, Mr. Boyer asked the Office of the Director General, Mr. Skin, "which should be some way for peer evaluation of the study was carried out by persons who are recognized as true experts in the research field, in accordance with the strict rules of WHO in this area "(WHA48/1995/REC/3). Although the project coordinator on cocaine, Mario Argandoña, had asked Hans Emblad, head of the PSA, to refrain from making public any version of the report in the arena of drug control until it had completed the peer assessment procedures, Mr. Emblad considered it appropriate to report at the session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs of 1995 on the interesting results of the investigation, which led to the intervention of the United States.

The project secretariat issued several lists containing several names of potential supervisors who were here and there for over two years. It was impossible to reach agreement on who should take over the task and, therefore, never took the final decision on the project. Although some of the experts of the study could publish some of his research, most of the results of the project on cocaine UNICRI WHO and never surfaced. That's how hundreds of pages containing valuable facts and opinions on coca and cocaine, the fruit of three years of more than 40 researchers and consultants, finally ended "on hoguer a".

El proyecto sobre cannabis de la OMS

The PSA began the WHO project on risk factors associated with the use of cannabis (WHO Project on Health Implications of Cannabis, in English) in 1993. WHO has published its latest report on cannabis and 12 years ago, in response to "numerous requests" to conduct a new study, the organization appointed a group of scientific experts on the subject (WHO/MSA/PSA/97.4 : 1). It was agreed that one of the research subjects would then carry out a "Comparative evaluation of physical and psychological consequences from the use of alcohol, cannabis, nicotine and opiates." The report, published in August 1995, concluded: "Considering the patterns of use, cannabis is a public health problem for much less than that of alcohol and snuff in Western societies" (Hall, 1995).

De acuerdo con uno de los investigadores, algunos responsables de la OMS “ enloquecieron ” al leer el informe (New Scientist, 1998). In a press release, WHO defended its decision to abolish the comparative conclusion of the final report arguing that there was "no attempt to conceal information and the decision not to include this comparison in the final report was based on scientific criteria unconnected s some political pressures "(WHO, 1998). The final report, published in 1997, included the following comment on the controversial comparing cannabis with alcohol and snuff:

"The expert group which prepared the revision of knowledge on cannabis in 1985 included a section in the draft report that it intended to compare the evidence on the health consequences of cannabis risks to the health of a number of licit and illegal as alcohol, snuff and opiates. However, the reliability and public health significance of such comparisons is questionable. (…) El riesgo cuantitativo del uso del cannabis supone una gran incógnita puesto que se carece de estudios epidemiológicos fidedignos y, por lo tanto, estas comparaciones tienden a ser de carácter más especulativo que científico ” (WHO/ MSA/PSA/97.4: 29).

El Informe Mundial sobre Drogas 1997

In late 1996, had managed to neutralize the positions and most controversial recommendations of previous years. Probably why, to lobby advocate of "zero tolerance" does not it funny to see how some of these ideas re-emerged in the World Drug Report of the UN in 1997. The report, prepared under the auspices of UNDCP, reflected in many ways more open climate that characterized the period leading up to the UNGASS and showed the initiatives taken by WHO and the PSA to rationalize the debate.

On the controversy of cannabis, for example, the report notes:

"It is undeniable that in some people and the type of use, cannabis causes problems in the physical and mental health, for example, loss of short-term memory, loss of concentration, motor problems, bronchial and lung, etc. . Moreover, such use does not present the same patterns of continuous use long term or dependent as cigarette smoking and there is a mortality rate directly attributed to the cumulative effects of cannabis. " The report concludes that "(a) in the context of illicit drugs, it seems the least harmful and (b) for a number of reasons, perhaps related to its status as a prohibited drug, health and social costs arising from their use have been far less harmful than snuff and alcohol "(UNDCP, 1997).

He devoted an entire chapter to "Discussion on regulation and legalization" (UNDCP, 1997: pp.184-201), written with the intention - as mentioned on the back - to go "beyond the rhetoric that often accompanies this subject:

"Over the past years have seen growing criticism that the funds for the 'war on drugs' has been wasted and that the drug control regime, instead of promoting the health and welfare of nations, could have aggravated the situation. (…) La sensación de haber alcanzado un punto muerto en el campo de las políticas sobre drogas ha dado pie a la aparición de numerosos grupos de presión que reivindican un cambio en la fiscalización de drogas internacional que implicaría suavizar el régimen prohibicionista – por ejemplo, modificando las Convenciones existentes en materia de fiscalización de drogas – y conceder mayor importancia a las medidas para la reducción del daño asociado al uso indebido de drogas. Since these groups are of heterogeneous origin and are composed of researchers, politicians, scientists, doctors, economists and leading opinion leaders, driven mostly by serious motivation and founded, represent a major challenge to current thinking on drug control. "

While no legalization as a priority, the chapter breaks with many of the prejudices prevailing in the debate and seeks smooth opposing positions. "The debate about regulation has deviated from its proper course due to excessive extremism on the one hand, the advocacy group 'zero tolerance' and, on the other, the legalizers." The World Drug Report had noted the wide range of political possibilities, saying: "The law - including international conventions - are not immutable and may change if the democratic will of nations so wishes". "

El fortalecimiento del mecanismo de la ONU

El primero de toda una serie de conflictos durante el período previo a la UNGASS surgió ya en la primera reunión del Comité Preparatorio en Viena, en marzo de 1997. At one point on the agenda called 'Application of international treaties on drug control', several countries - Australia, Mexico, South Africa, Sweden and Thailand - had a resolution on "strengthening the United Nations mechanism for the control international drugs. " The draft resolution recognizes that there is a high rate of abuse, cultivation, production and distribution of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and drug trafficking, an index, as well as high, was steadily increasing. For this reason, it was necessary to conduct a comprehensive review of drug control mechanism exists. It requested the Secretary-General to "appoint a small group of independent experts to undertake a general review on how they have evolved the efforts against illicit drugs within the United Nations system and in order to formulate measures to strengthen international cooperation against illicit drugs in the future "(E/CN.7/1997/L.6/Rev.1).

Both the U.S. and the UK disapproved of the word "independent", so the final version referred to "a small group of experts selected after appropriate consultations with, among other governments." Moreover, in the final version clarified that the "strengthening of the UN mechanism" should be "in the context of existing international treaties on drug control." Un año después, en marzo de 1998, el Secretario General Kofi Annan designó un grupo de “ trece expertos de alto rango ”. In fact, the committee was made by the board to complete the Preparatory Committee and some other national delegates (UNIS/NAR/627). After its first meeting in April, the group prepared a report on progress towards the UNGASS and after another two sessions, their results during the session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs in March 1999 (E/CN.7 / 1999/5).

As a side note, the group considered:

"... But to determine whether a treaty was or was not appropriate was not his concern, there were several key issues affecting the international system of drug control that needed to be addressed as a priority. One such issue was the Commission's ability to perform the functions entrusted treaties. The Panel noted that the Commission had not yet dealt with some fundamental issues of drug control which had been widely covered in the media, including the implementation of projects on the prescription of heroin to drug addicts and the change in how society views drug abuse and increased tolerance. "

A pesar de su escaso margen de maniobra y de la ausencia de miembros independientes ajenos al sistema de las Naciones Unidas, los trece componentes del grupo señalaron ciertas deficiencias en el funcionamiento de éste. Por ejemplo, coincidió en que el plan de acción de las Naciones Unidas sobre fiscalización del uso indebido de drogas no había alcanzado sus objetivos, tal como se había remarcado durante una reciente valoración nada favorable. Asimismo, recomendaba intensificar la colaboración entre el PNUFID, el PNUD (Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo) y ONUSIDA. Con respecto al funcionamiento de la Comisión de Estupefacientes, el grupo opinaba: “ En los últimos años, la Comisión ha tendido a dejar de ser una entidad técnica para convertirse en una entidad más política. (…) Las cuestiones relativas a la fiscalización de drogas, de importancia crítica o creciente, tampoco se abordaron adecuadamente, en parte como consecuencia de la forma en que estaba estructurado el programa de trabajo de la Comisión. La situación estaba socavando poco a poco el papel de la Comisión como principal órgano normativo de las Naciones Unidas en materia de fiscalización de drogas ”. Como resultado de todo ello, durante los años posteriores se han celebrado más reuniones entre los períodos de sesiones, ha aumentado la coordinación entre los países donantes y receptores del PNUFID y se han incorporado “ Debates temáticos ” al período de sesiones ordinario de la Comisión de Estupefacientes para fomentar una discusión más centrada y sustancial acerca de cuestiones clave sobre las políticas.

UNGASS 1988: el compromiso

El Comité Preparatorio que se reunió en marzo de 1997 tenía que decidir qué país asumiría la presidencia. México, que había desempeñado un papel fundamental en la organización de la Sesión Especial, se presentó como candidato con el apoyo del bloque GRULAC de países latinoamericanos y del Caribe. Los Estados Unidos, no obstante, sentían cierta inquietud por el tono crítico que había adoptado México recientemente. Así que echaron mano de la dimisión, hacía apenas un mes, del general Gutiérrez Rebollo, conocido como el “ zar antidroga ” de México propiciada por las acusaciones de que había estado protegiendo a Amado Carrillo Fuentes, el principal narcotraficante mexicano (Fazio, 1997). Con la excusa de la corrupción generalizada en los organismos antidroga mexicanos, los Estados Unidos impidieron la candidatura de México. Y sólo tras largas horas de negociaciones entre bastidores se alcanzó un acuerdo para apoyar la presidencia de Portugal.

México siguió representando un destacado papel durante los preparativos de la UNGASS presidiendo el grupo intergubernamental encargado de elaborar el borrador de los Principios rectores de la reducción de la demanda de drogas, uno de los documentos clave en la agenda de la UNGASS. México también presentó proyectos de texto sobre cuestiones como el blanqueo de dinero y los precursores químicos. El objetivo de México, en palabras del representante permanente ante la ONU de dicho país en Viena, consistía en adaptar el régimen internacional de control de drogas para que la reducción de la demanda adquiriera mayor importancia “ equilibrando así una estrategia que previamente estaba sesgada hacia un aspecto del problema ” (Lajous Vargas, 1998).

Se confiaba en que la UNGASS marcaría el fin de la “ época de señalar con el dedo ”. Como indicó el presidente colombiano Ernesto Samper en su discurso ante la Sesión Especial: “ Nadie está tan libre de pecado como para tirar la primera piedra ”. Tanto México como Colombia destacaron que se debería acabar con la antigua dicotomía entre países tradicionalmente productores y consumidores para dar paso al principio de la “ responsabilidad compartida ”. Este principio, según su opinión, debería convertirse en la piedra angular del control internacional de drogas y, para ello, no sólo había que admitir los desequilibrios del pasado, sino también que las fronteras tradicionales se habían desdibujado con el paso del tiempo. Tras una serie de arduas negociaciones, centradas en cuestiones sobre la reducción de la demanda y los precursores químicos, el resultado final de la UNGASS reflejó el ambiente que se respiraba. Al menos, en esencia. Muchos de los documentos aprobados hacen hincapié en la responsabilidad del “ Norte ” para, entre otras cosas, reducir la demanda, regular el comercio de precursores químicos, controlar la producción de estimulantes de tipo anfetamínico (EA) y abordar cuestiones como el blanqueo de dinero.

El principal impedimento para alcanzar este nuevo equilibrio surgió a partir de una propuesta presentada por Pino Arlacchi, al que se nombró nuevo director ejecutivo del PNUFID durante el proceso de preparación, en septiembre de 1997. Su plan SCOPE, cuyas siglas en inglés corresponden a la Estrategia para la Eliminación de la Coca y la Adormidera, se proponía erradicar estos cultivos en un plazo de diez años, es decir, para el 2008, e instaba a hacerlo en Colombia, Bolivia, Perú, Birmania, Laos, Vietnam, Afganistán y Pakistán, los ocho países en que se concentra la producción de coca y opio (Blickman, 1998). El plan SCOPE resucitó el discurso sobre un “ mundo libre de drogas ” mediante la total eliminación de cultivos relacionados con éstas, y habría devuelto el peso de la responsabilidad a los países productores de opio y coca.

Aunque el plan nunca se aprobó, aportó el impulso necesario para la adopción del artículo más polémico de la Declaración Política de la UNGASS: el artículo 19 que exhorta a “ eliminar o reducir considerablemente el cultivo ilícito del arbusto de coca, la planta de cannabis y la adormidera para el año 2008 ” (A/RES/S-20/2). Tras un acalorado debate, se acordó que se fijaría ese mismo año como fecha límite para “ eliminar o reducir considerablemente la fabricación, la comercialización y el tráfico ilícito de sustancias sicotrópicas, comprendidas las drogas sintéticas y la desviación de precursores ” así como para “lograr resultados importantes y mensurables en la esfera de la reducción de la demanda para el año 2008”. Estos son los puntos que constan en la agenda para la revisión de mitad de período de abril de 2003: “ examinar los avances alcanzados y los obstáculos encontrados ” cuando nos encontremos a mitad de camino del plazo fijado para 2008.

Durante la Sesión Especial, fueron pocos los delegados que siguieron manifestando sus dudas acerca del frágil consenso que tanto costó alcanzar. Raymond Kendall, Secretario General de Interpol, comentó: “ A pesar de que la aplicación de la ley constituye la razón de ser de Interpol, no creemos que sea la panacea de todos los males asociados a la problemática de la droga ”. Destacó la necesidad de nuevas políticas que actuaran especialmente sobre los factores que conducen a la aparición y al desarrollo de los denominados comportamientos anormales. Ello implicaría hacer frente a programas de reducción del riesgo con seriedad y conciencia, desde la perspectiva obligada de la salud pública. Añadió también que “ una nueva política no debería ser tan ingenua como para confundir la realidad con la fe demagógica y partir de información objetiva y de investigaciones multidisciplinarias ”. De modo parecido, el ministro de asuntos exteriores de los Países Bajos, Hans van Mierlo, insistió en la necesidad de iniciar estrategias basadas en nuevos resultados: “ Lo primero que deberíamos hacer sería evaluar los resultados de nuestros esfuerzos hasta el momento para poder discernir qué es lo que realmente funciona. No nos dejemos acorralar por las discusiones ideológicas del pasado al estudiar futuras estrategias. Ciñámonos en cambio a los hechos que hemos podido constatar a partir de nuestras prácticas durante los últimos años ” (A/S-20/PV.1-9).

Sin embargo, desde que se celebró la UNGASS en 1988, no se han tomado demasiadas iniciativas en ese sentido. El programa PSA de la OMS se desmanteló y se fundió de nuevo en 2000 con el Departamento de Salud Mental del que se había separado en 1990. Pino Arlacchi, el director ejecutivo del PNUFID, censuró gran parte del Informe Mundial sobre Drogas 2000. El capítulo sobre regulación, que debía ser la continuación del de 1997, desapareció por completo. El coordinador, Francisco Thoumi, abandonó la agencia manifestando su protesta. “ Arlacchi estaba muy preocupado porque el borrador original no reflejaba su visión de la situación de las drogas en el mundo. Consideraba que era demasiado pesimista y que no mostraba los recientes progresos alcanzados en la lucha contra la droga. Solía argüir que el problema mundial de las drogas estaba a punto de solucionarse y que sólo eran tres países lo que suponían un verdadero problema: Colombia, Afganistán y Birmania” (Thoumi, 2002). Parte del personal de PNUFID se vio obligado a abandonar la agencia o dimitió por sus diferencias con Arlacchi. Hubo una purga – por no hablar de caza de brujas – para limpiar el sistema de control de drogas de la ONU de cualquier elemento supuestamente “ derrotista ” que pudiera romper el ' espíritu de unión '.

Conclusions

El funcionamiento basado en el consenso propio del mecanismo de control de drogas de la ONU ha propiciado situaciones muy curiosas. “ Las drogas ilícitas pueden resultar de lo más paradójicas. El comportamiento irracional que, en principio, deberían mostrar las personas que las consumen es en ocasiones propio de muchas de las que no lo hacen ” (Grinspoon, 1993). En su fuero interno, “ la mayor parte de las autoridades considera que la erradicación de las drogas es una meta poco realista ” y que el régimen actual carece de la eficacia necesaria. Pero en cuanto toman asiento en las salas de conferencias de Viena y Nueva York, se suben al tren del consenso y la mayoría de los representantes se deja arrastrar por la retórica habitual mientras que la minoría procura pasar lo más desapercibida posible. Así pues, tras una década de conferencias de alto nivel durante la que se ha coincidido en que “ el mal avanza más aprisa que el remedio ”, se frena toda iniciativa para “ detectar las causas de la ineficacia del presente sistema de fiscalización ”. Los resultados de los estudios científicos patrocinados por la ONU se han desatendido de manera deliberada y cualquier iniciativa para formular ' los cambios que deben efectuarse ' se la lleva el viento. A pesar de todo lo expuesto, la comunidad internacional reunida en 1988 concluyó que se podría conseguir en 10 años lo que no se había logrado en los 25 que se fijaron como plazo en la Convención de 1961.

La JIFE declaró ya en su informe de 1994: “ La comunidad internacional ha expresado su deseo de que, en lugar de reabrir todos los debates, prefiere desarrollar las estrategias definidas en común y ampliar sus principios a fin de establecer la manera de fortalecer las medidas de fiscalización de drogas ” (E/INCB/1994/1/Sup.1: 8). Poco importa si la estrategia no proporciona resultados positivos siempre que la comunidad internacional muestre un mayor compromiso: “ Esperamos que el año que viene, a diferencia de éste, podamos hablar de progresos reales” . “ Cualquier duda, vacilación o revisión injustificada de la validez de los objetivos que deben alcanzarse socavarían nuestro compromiso ”. Los numerosos llamamientos – procedentes de la propia “ comunidad internacional ” – para “ analizar con criterio estrategias para el futuro y, además, hacerlo con una actitud abierta que esté dispuesta a aprender de las lecciones del pasado ya experimentar cuando sea necesari o” se han topado con acusaciones maniqueístas – típicas de la guerra fría – sobre la traición a “ nuestra noble causa ”.

Por lo tanto, no es de extrañar el hecho de que “ la sociedad civil muestre una creciente impacienci a”, según observó muy acertadamente el Secretario General. Los resultados de la revisión de la UNGASS, que tendrá lugar en abril de 2003, sin duda se convertirán, tal como predijo el presidente de la Sesión, en “ la prueba de fuego para demostrar la capacidad de respuesta de la comunidad internacional ante los complejos problemas planteados tras el fin de la guerra fría ”. Para superar la prueba, quizá sería buena idea retomar algunas de las iniciativas del período precedente a la UNGASS y volver a añadirlas a la agenda. Las circunstancias han variado considerablemente desde entonces y, en estos momentos, podrían alcanzarse conclusiones distintas:

(1) Transcurridos ya cinco años, ya pesar del compromiso político renovado en la UNGASS, no se ha realizado ningún avance en términos de consumo y producción. Los ministros quedarían en el más completo ridículo si, en la reunión de abril, se limitaran a seguir afirmando que para 2008 habrán conseguido “ eliminar o reducir significativamente ” los cultivos de coca, la adormidera y la cannabis y la producción de drogas sintéticas.

(2) La Oficina contra la Droga y el Delito de la ONU (ODC, siglas en inglés) está experimentando un proceso de reforma emprendido por su nuevo director ejecutivo, Antonio Costa, que permitirá a la agencia despedirse de la crisis de los últimos años y de la censura impuesta por su predecesor. Puede que ello amplíe la capacidad del PNUFID, que se enmarca dentro de la ODC, para ejercer su función como “ centro de investigación ” animando el debate político sobre las drogas en el ámbito internacional.

(3) En el Plan de Acción desarrollado para aplicar la Declaración sobre los principios rectores de la reducción de la demanda de drogas de la UNGASS, los países se comprometieron a ofrecer “ todo el espectro de servicios, incluida la reducción de las consecuencias perjudiciales para la sociedad y la salud del uso indebido de drogas ” (A/RES/54/132). El drama del SIDA en todo el mundo ha puesto de relieve la necesidad de tomar medidas de reducción del riesgo para afrontar la propagación del virus relacionada con el uso de drogas por vía intravenosa. La Declaración de compromiso en la lucha contra el VIH/SIDA adoptada por la UNGASS en junio de 2001 insta explícitamente a las naciones a garantizar para 2005 un mayor acceso a equipo esterilizado para inyecciones, ya fomentar “actividades para la reducción de los daños causados por el consumo de drogas” (A/RES/S-26/2: art. 52). Así pues, resulta imposible – además de irresponsable – seguir evitando un debate abierto sobre el concepto de reducción del daño en el ámbito de la Comisión de Estupefacientes.

(4) Varios países han relajado sus leyes sobre el cannabis y en toda Europa y el Canadá se están desarrollando debates más objetivos sobre la posibilidad de la despenalización y la legalización. Este clima político vuelve a plantear en el ámbito de la ONU las tradicionales dudas acerca de las incoherencias en los tratados sobre el cannabis y la coca. Tal como ya se señaló en 1971, el cannabis “ no forma parte – y, objetivamente, nunca lo hizo – de las disposiciones de un tratado cuyo objetivo explícito consiste en prevenir la 'adicción a los estupefacientes.' La inclusión del cannabis en un tratado sobre estupefacientes fue una equivocación debida a los datos médicos y científicos erróneos de que disponían los delegados cuando se preparó el proyecto del tratado ” (Leinwand, 1971).

Aunque la historia presentada en este artículo atestigua los límites del funcionamiento racional del mecanismo de control de drogas de la ONU , estos últimos acontecimientos podrían crear las condiciones necesarias para que un grupo de países con ideas afines puedan acabar con la actual parálisis. El ministro de exteriores George Papandreou anunció una iniciativa tomada por la presidencia griega de la UE en ese sentido: “ El primer paso para encontrar nuevas maneras de abordar el problema de las drogas debería consistir en una evaluación exhaustiva de los tratados internacionales en esta materia. Debemos verificar su eficacia, poner al descubierto sus puntos débiles y presentar propuestas con miras a encontrar otros métodos para formular y aplicar las políticas sobre drogas ” (Papandreou, 2002).

Reconocimientos

El autor desea expresar su agradecimiento al Fondo Europeo para Políticas de Drogas NEF, por el apoyo financiero brindado al Transnational Institute durante el período de investigación y redacción de este documento.

Martin Jelsma
TNI , enero de 2003

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