Summary

The "international community" showed an apparent unanimously to ratify the prohibitionist approach on drug control in the 1998 Special Session of the General Assembly (UNGASS, an acronym in English) on drugs. But the truth is that there is a long conflict within UN facing the nations who wish to maintain the regime of prohibition and aspiring to adopt a more pragmatic approach. The complexity and the course of this conflict can be traced through the thousands of documents and proceedings published by the UN to reveal the unwritten history of the events leading up to the UNGASS. They revealed how far they have come the hard-line supporters to maintain the status quo, using rhetoric, denial, manipulation, selective presentation, misrepresentation and suppression of evidence, selective use of experts, threats on the allocation of funds and purging "defeatists" of the UN system. The UN is committed to achieving a drug free world by 2008, although the problem gets worse at higher speed than the remedy used needs to fix it. However, some advocates of reform and pragmatics have been challenging the system through their national policies. That may encourage adoption of a more realistic approach to illicit drugs and help establish a more rational organization of the control system of the UN drug.

• Drugs in the UN system: the unwritten history of the 1998 United Nations General Assembly Special Session on drugs, by Martin Jelsma (TNI) in the Special Issue on the UNGASS Mid-term Review of the International Journal of Drug Policy April 2003 (Volume 14 , Issue 2)

Introduction

Kofi Annan proposed a toast at the 20th Special Session of the General Assembly (UNGASS, an acronym in English) on the global problem of drugs, took place between 8 and June 10, 1998: "Excellencies, friends, let me win the cup with the hope that when us recall this meeting, we do because it was the moment our challenges turned on the testimony of our commitment. The time we committed to cooperate to become a family of free nations drugs in the XXI century ". Just days before the meeting, Mr. Annan's speech videotaped collecting the following words: "Our commitment is to achieve real results in the elimination of drug crops by 2008. I hope that this session will go down in history as the moment when the international community reached consensus needed to undertake this business seriously. " President of the Special Session, Mr. Udovenko (Ukraine), opened the meeting saying: "The drug problem can not be disguised with good intentions and the international community must be prepared for a long, hard battle." And, at the close of the summit, stressed the need for "greater convergence of views" and a "spirit of unity." He also expressed his hope that the session "go down in history as a watershed event" and in conclusion he added: "We have a good strategy and a series of measures and targets to be met within a specified period" ( A/S-20/PV.1-9).

The international community is about to review this event by mid-UNGASS period to be held between 16 and 17 April in Vienna. At present, one wonders if, five years later, we confirm the optimism of Annan and Udovenko as a "watershed event"? Can we raise our glasses to celebrate the "real results"? What was the scope of "consensus" point? Will they meet the delegates in April 2003 with the same "spirit of unity"? This article reconstructs the unwritten history of the UNGASS 1988 and the tremendous effort of justifying the current debate about drugs in the United Nations system.

A busy decade: 1991-2000

In 1987 in Vienna International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking. In 1988 he adopted the Vienna Convention against Illicit Traffic. In 1990, the General Assembly held its first Special Session of the problem of drugs approved a Global Programme of Action and announced that the period 1991-2000 was to become the United Nations Decade against Drug Abuse. In 1991, he created a program of the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP). Thus was set the stage for the UN for a new era of action against drugs.

The Decade Against Drug Abuse certainly became one of the busiest time for managers and policy makers on drug worldwide. The first major step was the convening of a three-day meeting of the highest levels of the 1993 General Assembly to "examine urgently the situation of international cooperation" in the field of drug control. It was hoped that the "Berlin Wall" and the end of ideological confrontation facilitate the search for common ground and enhance international collaboration. In the opening speech of the meeting, its chairman said that the victory of the international community about the misuse of drugs "would be the litmus test to demonstrate their ability to respond to the issues raised after the end of the Cold War" . But, was the international community to move from words to action in his comprehensive campaign against illegal drugs? In the opinion of the president, the answer to this question would show whether countries could "cooperate in harmony for the common good" (A/48/PV.37).

This harmony, however, would be broken by the still existing dichotomy between North and South and by the European experiments for harm reduction, two facts that cast doubt on the validity of the control framework of existing drugs.

The Mexican voice

It was a letter from Mexico addressed to the Secretary General of the UN that set the tone for the 1993 meeting. It detailed a number of key points. Because, despite the efforts, consumption was increasing and criminal organizations flourished and spread, Mexico raised the event as a unique opportunity for international reflection, at the time, and because of the severity of the situation had become imperative. Mexico requested that more attention be given to the demand for "drug use is the driving force of production and traffic of the same, the reduction in demand is revealed as a radical solution - although in the long term - the problem" . Also opined that "the most effective way to bring down the production and trafficking of narcotics is the gradual reduction of both current customers as of the possible". It is clear that this letter contained a strong indictment against the anti-drug operations conducted by the United States in Mexico and the mechanism of drug unilateral U.S. certification. The letter noted that for the united front against addiction and drug trafficking to gain ground, required good faith, principles of legality, political will, ability to work together, recognizing the identity of each nation and unconditional respect for their sovereign rights. He also decried the "hegemonic impositions", the "politics of blame" and "guilt by pointing out geographical Manichaeism schemes that solve nothing" (A/C.3/48/2).

Mexico also stressed the need to review the classification of drugs according to the criteria of the World Health Organization (WHO) "to reduce the illicit drug market", which hinted that he considered the control of certain substances was abandoned. The letter specified the issues to be considered with greater urgency to the idea of "balanced approach" being taken seriously. Most of these issues appear, five years later in the agenda of the UNGASS: demand reduction, money laundering, chemical precursors, synthetic drugs and increased investment in alternative development.

An inherent imbalance

Mexico's letter reflected the tensions between the U.S. and Latin America on drugs, as well as the traditional division between demand and supply in the system of international drug control. Both events resulted from the imbalance in political power relations in the shadow of that negotiated the three conventions. The 1961 Convention focused on the "drug" and was conceived largely as an instrument of control of the coca / cocaine, opium / heroin and cannabis. The main objective is aimed to drugs extracted from plants whose cultivation, at the time, was widespread in the South with a long tradition of using raw materials derived from such plants. The classification of the various plants and their products (no chemical precursors used for processing) listings stricter control was not conducted according to scientific studies, but based on the idea that all drugs are dangerous until proven so Otherwise (Sinha, 2001: 26). However, during the negotiations of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971, centered on the substances produced synthetically by the pharmaceutical industry in the North, the charges took a 180 degree turn and "unless there was evidence of the danger of a given substance, it should not be penalized "(Sinha, 2001: 27). The Convention on Illicit Traffic of 1988 required the signatories to criminalize all aspects of illicit drug trafficking, cultivation, manufacture, distribution, sale, possession, money laundering, etc.. and "ensure that the courts or authorities of each State would treat such illegal activities as felonies" (E/CN.7/590: 48).

The penalty mandatory drug possession for personal consumption established by the Vienna Convention of 1988 was the first intrusion - very controversial, for sure - the idea that demand management was a matter of law depended each country. The control system set up by the convention was intended to end the illicit supply, while demand-side policies were seen as a national issue. When raised the possibility of a fourth convention specifically aimed at reducing demand, the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) was against the idea because he doubted that it could adopt a binding international treaty on reducing or demand that the treaty was the appropriate instrument to address the issue. The Board felt that reducing the demand was made to be played by each country independently, although in some cases need international support. It also considered that "programs to reduce demand should be developed at national and local levels, according to the actual situation of drug abuse and taking into account the cultural, political, economic and legal". (E/INCB/1994/1/Sup.1: 6).

The prohibition in question

In fact, Mexico expressed the frustration shared by many Latin American producing countries the imbalance inherent in the international system of drug control. So what should counter was precisely this imbalance. In addition to this imbalance, the international community realized that the control measures had proved ineffective drugs, which questioned the concept that was based prohibitionist system. The INCB report for 1992 was another document that had a notable influence during the period preceding the 1993 General Assembly. In this, the Board included first extensive comments on the legalization debate raised by concluding that the Dutch policy on cannabis violated the principles of the conventions (Polak, 1994). The Commission on Narcotic Drugs had also devoted part of its 1993 session to discuss the report of the INCB and the Board agreed that any attempt to legalize non-medical use of drugs undermine the international drug control and, therefore jeopardize the implementation of existing international treaties in this field. And, in the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, these treaties "are the backbone of the system" (E/1993/29: párr.44).

The then executive director of the UNDCP, Giorgio Giacomelli, read a statement on behalf of the Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to the 1993 General Assembly which called on member states to keep two questions: "First, the speed extending the scourge, with all its consequences on society and crime, on the other, the fact that civil society shows a growing impatience that leads to simplistic or defeatist solutions take. We need more than ever, determined action worldwide "(A/48/PV.37: 4). The appearance of another apparent disagreement was already in sight.

A system with teeth

The disagreement became more and more apparent over the next three days, during which several delegates stressed the need to "reaffirm the commitment," "strengthen" and "strengthen" the existing system. As the delegate of the United Kingdom, Mr. Richardson:

"We have the mechanism. What we must do now is to improve its operation. In particular, we need a more united international front to defend the United Nations Convention of 1988. The convention is an instrument with teeth, and we make it bite. "Thus, any position to question the effectiveness of existing legislation was seen as" defeatism "or" waiver "."

Mr. Bengt Westerberg of Sweden was expressed as follows:

"We detect illicit drugs increased in all areas: farming, processing, trafficking and consumption. Some people are abandoning the fight alleging that the drug problem is insoluble. In reality, they mean that could not solve the problem within the framework of existing legislation. (...) We must not give up and accept the cowardly policy advocating the legalization supporters. "

Mr. Antonino murmurs, the Assistant Secretary of State of Italy, shared this view:

"I must express my concern about the growing trend in favor of legalizing drugs and the fatalistic attitude that considers the war on drugs is a" lost cause ". I consider this kind of position could pose a danger it would weaken our commitment against drug trafficking. (...) At present, therefore, we must not lose heart and withdraw our commitment, but to renew and assert our determination to win this war. "

The start of the debate

However, other delegates used terms such as "review", "general assessment", "try new strategies" and "rethink our actions." It is true that none of them advocated legalization, but many advocated a more lenient approach to consumption, for example, Mr. Torben Lund, Denmark's minister of health, saying: "I think we have reached a point where we understand that new approaches are needed to address the drug problem. (...) Perhaps we should stop focusing on the application of the law and deal instead of prevention and treatment. "

Mr. Baltasar Garzon Real also stressed the need to initiate an objective debate. The judge reached after an internationally renowned for its legal battles against the death squads in Spain antivascos (GAL), the Galician drug cartels, the Chilean dictator Pinochet and Batasuna, a political party linked to ETA. In 1993, Mr. Garzón acted as representative of the National Drug Plan of Spain and declared:

"It is time to pause and reflect on the solutions to be adopted. I have the intention to recommend in my country the beginning of a general discussion to assess the achievements and reflect on the future. To address a debate of this nature, we must get rid of all preconceived opinions and dogmas unbreakable. We must be open to the exchange of ideas. It is desirable that the United Nations followed a similar thought process into it and foster it beyond its doors. This proposal is the result of the conviction that the United Nations is the ideal forum and better dissemination tool to exchange ideas and where decisions on new guidelines to help us achieve our goals. "

Podría decirse, por lo tanto, que 1993 fue el año de la “ presentación en sociedad ” de la tendencia europea – a la que se suman también Australia y Canadá – que ya está firmemente consolidada bajo el estandarte de la reducción del daño. El debate concluyó el 28 de octubre de 1993 con la adopción de la resolución 48/12 cuyo borrador corrió a cargo de México. As stipulated by the resolution, the General Assembly would request the Commission on Narcotic Drugs to monitor and assess the functioning of international instruments and national drug control to identify areas in which they had made good progress and weaknesses. Also recommend to the Economic and Social Council in its series of high-level segment of 1995 "changes to be made ​​in drug control activities." Finally, consider the possibility of appointing a panel of experts as an additional tool to examine the issues involved and to make "concrete recommendations for action" (A/RES/48/12, art. 9 and 11).

Then came several initiatives, but their path clearly defined political boundaries in search of "appropriate adjustments" in the drug control system. Peru and Bolivia renewed diplomatic efforts to defend the traditional use of coca in their countries. WHO continued to try to gain ground in favor of the philosophy of harm reduction in the UN system and initiated several scientific studies. They began to raise the need to revise the classification established in the conventions on the products of coca and cannabis. Proposals were presented to analyze the cost and benefits of harm reduction and decriminalization strategies. And in 1984, Mexico began to muster the support needed to hold an international summit dedicated to the reflection that ultimately led to the 1998 UNGASS.

The opinion of the INCB on cannabis and coca

Como complemento a la resolución aprobada por la Asamblea General, el PNUFID designó un grupo consultivo especial e intergubernamental cuyo objetivo consistía en formular recomendaciones sobre los “ cambios que deben efectuarse ”. This group had the advice of Mr. Hamid Ghodse, INCB President on the effectiveness of international treaties on drug control (E/CN.7/1995/14). En un detallado informe de valoración presentado por el Sr. Ghodse, la JIFE manifestaba: “ En estos momentos, no parece necesario introducir grandes modificaciones en los tratados internacionales sobre fiscalización de drogas. It takes only a few technical adjustments to update some of its provisions "and some" defects should be eliminated "(E/INCB/1994/1: par. 21, b, c).

Since "have used modern agricultural technologies and more sophisticated to develop new varieties of high-potency cannabis," the INCB stated: "... the classification of cannabis products in the 1961 Convention, namely, cannabis and cannabis resin, is obsolete and leads to confusion. For example, the coca leaf is not contained in this Convention, despite its content of THC. Accordingly, the Board recommends that consideration be given to strengthen the Articles of the 1961 Convention on the control of cannabis taking into account the current and expanding the control of, among others, the coca leaf, which in many cases contains more THC than cannabis resin. To do this, it may be necessary to weigh the reclassification of cannabis plant and derived products in the 1961 Convention to ensure that there is a correlation between the power plant and its products "(E/INCB/1994 / 1/Sup.1: 10/11).

In the case of the coca leaf, the Board noted that "the need to clarify ambiguities." One of the goals it had set the 1961 Convention, which entered into force in December 1964 had been "abolished" the chewing of coca leaf in a period of 25 years, ie 1989. The Convention also established deadlines for other plant-derived substances that were never fulfilled, "the use of quasi-medical opium must be abolished within 15 years" and "the use of cannabis for other than medical and Scientists must cease as soon as possible but in any event within 25 years "(Convention, 1961: art. 49). Is evident that not been reached none of these objectives. On the other hand, the INCB claimed that there was an error in the text of the treaty because it did not provide non-medical use of coca leaf: the consumption of coca tea or coca tea.

"So, mate de coca, is considered harmless and legal in several South American countries, is part of an illegal activity under the provisions of the 1961 Convention and the Convention of 1988, though that was not the intention of the conference plenipotentiary that adopted those conventions "(E/INCB/1994/1/Supp. 1: 11).

La Junta solicitó que se revisara la manera en que la Convención de 1961 permitía de manera temporal este uso tradicional de la coca y pidió que la OMS realizara un examen científico sobre los valores y los riesgos relacionados con la masticación de la coca y el mate de coca. A tenor de sus declaraciones, parecía estar bastante convencida de los resultados de dicho examen: “ La Junta confía en que la Comisión de Estupefacientes, partiendo de estudios científicos, aclare este tipo de ambigüedades que han estado minando las convenciones durante largo tiempo ” (E/ INCB/1994/1/Supp. 1: 11).

El grupo consultivo

Los diez integrantes del grupo consultivo especial se seleccionaron con sumo cuidado. México estuvo representado por Miguel Ruiz-Cabañas, que en aquel momento trabajaba en la embajada mexicana de Washington y que más tarde se hizo cargo del departamento antidroga del ministerio de asuntos exteriores de su país. El grupo incluía también a los Estados Unidos, la India, la Argentina, la Federación de Rusia, Suecia, Polonia, Japón, Egipto y Nigeria. El representante de éste último país fue Philip O. Emafo, que en aquellos momentos era consultor del PNUFID y que más tarde pasó a ocupar la presidencia de la JIFE. No se invitó a ninguno de los países conocidos por sus concepciones más liberales. El grupo se reunió en dos ocasiones durante la segunda mitad de 1994 en Viena. Además de respaldar la filosofía de la JIFE, elogió su informe de 1992 que, en opinión del grupo, proporcionaba sólidos argumentos “ para contrarrestar el fuerte movimiento que pretende demostrar que el régimen internacional de fiscalización de drogas, fundamentado en la aplicación de tratados internacionales en esta materia, había fracasado y que la única solución pasaba por la legalización ” (UNDCP/1994/AG.7: párr.5). Uno de los miembros exigió incluso que se intentara poner freno a la idea de la “ reducción del daño ”, ya que se consideraba una fuente importante de las posturas enfrentadas. “La reducción del daño se consideraba el caballo de Troya de las facciones que defendían la causa de la legalización” (UNDCP/1994/AG.7: párr.60).

No obstante, “ un estudio más detallado sobre las implicaciones de la despenalización y de las campañas para la reducción del daño, tal como sugirió el grupo consultivo, podría ofrecer nuevas perspectivas que condujeran a soluciones insospechadas ” (E/CN.7/1995/14: párr.45). En el informe dirigido a la Comisión de Estupefacientes, en que se entretejían las sugerencias de la JIFE y del grupo consultivo, el director ejecutivo recomendaba la adopción de un doble enfoque. En primer lugar, el PNUFID debía proporcionar “ argumentos concretos y sólidos contra la legalización del uso de estupefacientes con fines no terapéuticos ” y colaborar con la OMS en la preparación de informes sobre las consecuencias para la salud, tanto físicas como psíquicas, provocadas por el uso indebido de drogas especialmente peligrosas. En segundo, el PNUFID debía “ emprender un estudio sobre las implicaciones de la despenalización y de las campañas para la reducción del daño ” en los países que ya habían adoptado este tipo de políticas. La Comisión se encargaría entonces de dar una orientación sobre las siguientes medidas que debían tomarse (E/CN.7/1995/14: párr.52).

El grupo consultivo secundaba la idea de convocar una segunda Conferencia Internacional sobre el Uso Indebido y el Tráfico Ilícito de Drogas como la de 1987. “ Dicha conferencia ofrecería la posibilidad de, entre otros, valorar los éxitos gubernamentales en materia de fiscalización del uso indebido de drogas y adoptar una declaración de principios sobre la reducción de la demanda. Se consideraba que la conferencia sería el foro adecuado donde se podrían reunir los gobiernos y el PNUFID para reafirmar los principios y las posturas sobre la legalización, la despenalización, la reducción del daño y otras cuestiones importantes ” (UNDCP/1994/AG.7: párr.79). El Sr. Giorgio Giacomelli, director ejecutivo del PNUFID, reflejó esta recomendación en su informe a la Comisión de Estupefacientes puntualizando que el evento no debía limitarse únicamente a “ reafirmar ” sino también a “ estudiar ” dichas posturas (E/CN.7/1995/14: párr.35).

El grupo reconoció que las estrategias de reducción de la demanda serían convenientes “ en el marco de un sistema sanitario público que abarque otras substancias nocivas, incluidos los disolventes volátiles, los esteroides anabólicos, el alcohol y el tabaco ”. Rememoraron un discurso pronunciado por el Sr. Giacomelli durante la apertura de la sesión de la Comisión de Estupefacientes en 1994 en que éste señalaba que era

“… cada vez más difícil justificar la continua distinción entre substancias teniendo sólo en cuenta su situación legal o su aceptación social. En la medida en que la adicción a la nicotina, el alcoholismo y el uso indebido de disolventes e inhalantes pueden representar una mayor amenaza para la salud que el abuso de otras substancias sometidas actualmente a la fiscalización internacional, el pragmatismo llevaría a concluir que seguir con estrategias disparatadas para minimizar su impacto es, en última instancia, una medida artificial, irracional y poco rentable ” (UNDCP, 1994).

El grupo consultivo coincidió con la JIFE en que se deberían corregir aquellos puntos de las convenciones que consideraba débiles o contradictorios. Ello llevó al director ejecutivo a apuntar que, para llevar a cabo esta misión, se podría emplear un método simplificado ya integrado en las convenciones. Dicho método permite que cualquier país signatario de las convenciones presente una enmienda ante el Secretario General de la ONU que se difundirá entre resto de las partes firmantes. En caso de que, transcurridos 18 meses, ningún país presente objeción alguna, la enmienda entra en vigor de manera automática (E/CN.7/1995/14: par.13). No obstante, opinaba que este procedimiento no funcionaría con las propuestas sugeridas. Por lo tanto, recomendó que la Comisión de Estupefacientes, junto con la JIFE, solicitara al PNUFID que designara un “ grupo de expertos para estudiar la validez de las definiciones existentes en las convenciones de 1961 y de 1971, con especial atención a varios productos derivados de la cannabis y de la hoja de coca ” (E/CN.7/1995/14: párr.46c). Sugirió también que el PNUFID creara un foro adecuado, como un grupo de expertos o un grupo de trabajo, encargado de supervisar los avances logrados y de valorar la eficacia de los programas de desarrollo alternativo.

A continuación, se invitó a los Estados miembro de la Junta de Estupefacientes a comentar por escrito dichas recomendaciones. Los comentarios aparecieron resumidos en un segundo informe del director ejecutivo de la Comisión de Estupefacientes un año más tarde (E/CN.7/1996/3). Australia, Austria, Bélgica, el Brasil, Colombia, el Perú, el Reino Unido y Sudáfrica fueron los países que presentaron sus respuestas por escrito. El Perú estimaba que “ era necesario reexaminar las formas tradicionales de abordar la cuestión de la fiscalización de las drogas ” y que, por lo tanto, una conferencia internacional “ debería estar orientada hacia el futuro y promover soluciones innovadora en lugar de dejarse influir excesivamente por las formas tradicionales de encarar el problema ”. El Perú y Sudáfrica refrendaron la propuesta de formar un grupo de expertos sobre la coca y el cannabis y un foro parecido para valorar los programas de desarrollo alternativo. Sudáfrica y Australia apoyaron la idea de efectuar un estudio sobre las consecuencias de la despenalización y las políticas de reducción del daño, con la condición, según expresó Australia, de que si se valoraban programas de tal índole también “ había que evaluar otros modelos de programas de fiscalización del uso indebido de drogas, y que toda evaluación que se hiciese de estos programas, incluidos los basados en la contención de los daños, debía ser equilibrada e imparcial ”. En lo referente a la segunda parte del doble plan, que pretendía que se facilitaran “ argumentos concretos y fundados contra la legalización ”, Australia opinaba que, si se realizaba dicho estudio, “ debía ser imparcial y abordar los argumentos en pro y en contra de la legalización, para que pudiera celebrarse un debate equilibrado y abierto ”. En el segundo informe se solicitaba a la Comisión de Estupefacientes que decidiera en su próxima sesión si el PNUFID debería designar un grupo de expertos que trabajara sobre el desarrollo alternativo, otro sobre la situación de “ diversos productos de la cannabis y de la hoja de coca ” y si debería estudiar la idea de la legalización “ teniendo en cuenta los argumentos de los proponentes y de los oponentes de dicha legalización ”.

Última parada: Comisión de Estupefacientes 1995/1996

En opinión de Robin Room, quien analizó el debate general mantenido durante el período de sesiones de la Comisión de Estupefacientes en 1995: “ El disidente más destacado de la retórica dominante hay que hallarlo en los Países Bajos. Dicho país ha asumido en el seno de la Comisión de Estupefacientes un papel que podría compararse al del joven del cuento sobre el traje nuevo del emperador: el del personaje sincero ”. Como ejemplo, Room cita al representante neerlandés cuando afirma: “ El conjunto de la situación podría definirse en términos de 'efectos multiplicadores criminogénicos tremendos' (…) Con la puesta en práctica de la Convención de 1988 ahondaremos nuestros conocimientos. Pero no por ello amainará el temporal ” (Room, 1999). Aunque la mayoría de los delegados coincidía en que la situación empeoraba cada año, pocos osaron atribuir el problema a errores de estrategia o cuestionar las convenciones y defender la necesidad de encontrar enfoques alternativos. El discurso dominante abogaba únicamente por redoblar los esfuerzos y mejorar la cooperación: “ La situación resulta desalentadora pero debe dar paso a una acción concertada y no ser fuente de desánimo ”, afirmó el delegado noruego. Uruguay advirtió del peligro que suponía la mera manifestación de posturas disidentes: “ Sentimos una profunda preocupación por las opiniones que se han mostrado a favor de liberalizar el consumo de drogas. (…) Las Naciones Unidas deben hacer uso de su privilegiada posición y mostrar una actitud clara. Cualquier duda, vacilación o revisión injustificada de la validez de los objetivos que deben alcanzarse socavaría nuestro compromiso. (…) Nuestras metas son tan nobles como inflexibles. Y nunca alcanzaremos el éxito si hay notas discordantes. No podemos ceder y debemos mantenernos firmes con respecto a nuestros objetivos ” (Room, 1999).

Sin embargo, las notas discordantes siguieron sonando. La Interpol, al igual que los Países Bajos, cuestionó la validez de la estrategia seguida para alcanzar las metas fijadas. Haciendo balance del debate general de 1995, “ Me recuerda al título de la película 'El próximo año a la misma hora'. Los años se suceden sin que la situación experimente una verdadera mejoría. (…) Esperamos que el año que viene, a diferencia de éste, podamos hablar de progresos reales ”. Australia continuó defendiendo la necesidad de mantener un debate más abierto: “ En el momento en que ciertos Estados están cuestionando la eficacia de los tratados y se apunta a soluciones sencillas, como la legalización, debemos contemplar la posibilidad de tomar medidas alternativas al castigo e intercambiar impresiones en la Comisión. Se deben seguir estudiando estrategias alternativas. No abogamos por un cambio en concreto, sino que nos limitamos a hacer constar que no hay que descartar nuevos enfoques que quizá no se ajusten a los paradigmas actuales. (…) La Comisión de Estupefacientes debe estudiar planteamientos legítimos como la reducción del daño y no rechazarlos de plano ”. Bolivia apuntó que “ era imposible seguir por el mismo camino ” y solicitó que se celebrara una cumbre mundial para “ identificar las causas del fracaso del presente sistema de control ” (Room, 1999).

En el próximo período de sesiones, que iba a tener lugar en abril de 1996, la Comisión de Estupefacientes debía decidir qué hacer con las recomendaciones formuladas por el grupo consultivo y la JIFE y con los comentarios presentados por los Estados miembro. Las propuestas que deberían haber servido para abrir el debate y preparar el terreno para introducir cambios en el régimen se descartaron una por una:

“ Si bien hubo cierto apoyo a la convocación de una reunión del un grupo de expertos encargado de examinar la idoneidad de las definiciones actuales de la Convención de 1961 y el Convenio de 1971, con especial referencia a los diversos productos de la cannabis y de la hoja de coca, (…) se expresó la opinión de que no deberían convocarse reuniones de grupos de expertos sobre otras cuestiones de la competencia de la Junta Internacional de Fiscalización de Estupefacientes ” (E/1996/27: Supp. 7, párr.16).

Lo que, dicho en otras palabras, significaba que no se iba a reexaminar la situación del cannabis y de la coca.

La posibilidad de estudiar la despenalización y el concepto de la reducción del daño se vio obstaculizada de otro modo:

“ Se expresó una fuerte oposición a la legalización del uso de drogas para fines no terapéuticos. Esta medida no sólo sería contraria a las disposiciones de los tratados internacionales sobre fiscalización de drogas, sino que representaría además un grave revés para la cooperación internacional en materia de fiscalización de drogas. “Si bien se mostró cierto apoyo a que el PNUFID realizase investigaciones sobre la cuestión de la legalización del uso de drogas para fines no terapéuticos, se observó que esta investigación podría ser mal interpretada por los proponentes de la legalización ” (E/1996/27: Supp. 7, párr.21).

Esta idea sólo se “ manifestó ” y no se aprobó, pero indicaba que no existía un consenso al respecto y que, por lo tanto, no se podría realizar el estudio.

Por último, se descartó la propuesta de organizar una conferencia internacional como la de 1987 donde se podrían haber adoptado enmiendas a las convenciones. Como motivo, se adujo que supondría un “ elevado costo ” en un momento en que “ las Naciones Unidas atravesaban la peor crisis financiera desde su fundación. La Comisión llegó a la conclusión de que muchos de los objetivos de una conferencia podrían conseguirse igualmente convocando un período extraordinario de sesiones de la Asamblea General ” (E/1996/27: Sup.7, párr.18). En el sistema de las Naciones Unidas se recurre con frecuencia a motivos económicos para detener planes sin la necesidad de aportar razones con fundamento. La crisis económica a la que se aludía se derivaba, en gran medida, del hecho de que los Estados Unidos habían dejado de pagar su cuota y debían a la ONU billones de dólares. Así pues, la Comisión de Estupefacientes adoptó una resolución (E/CN.7/1996/L.16) en la que recomendaba la celebración de lo que se convirtió en la UNGASS de 1998. Su objetivo consistía en “ conseguir un compromiso renovado por parte de los gobiernos para luchar contra el uso indebido y el tráfico ilícito de estupefacientes, así como fortalecer la aplicación del instrumento de fiscalización de drogas internacional ” (E/1996/27: Sup.7, párr.17). El contenido del documento era de total reafirmación y términos como “ valorar ”, “ estudiar ”, “ revisión científica ”, “ detectar puntos débiles ”, “ cambios que deben efectuarse ” o “ desarrollar nuevas estrategias ” no consiguieron sobrevivir al período de sesiones de la Comisión de Estupefacientes y, por lo tanto, no se reflejaron en la resolución final.

La reunión de alto nivel del ECOSOC en 1996

Antes de poder presentar los resultados de la sesión ante la Asamblea General, éstos debían pasar por el Consejo Económico y Social (ECOSOC), el organismo que acoge a la Comisión de Estupefacientes como una de sus agencias. El ECOSOC dedicó un segmento de alto nivel de tres días al análisis de los resultados de la reunión de la Comisión de Estupefacientes (E/1996/SR.10-15). El entonces presidente de la JIFE, Sr. Schroeder, dejó muy claro su punto de vista durante la sesión de apertura: “ Los gobiernos no deben olvidar que los experimentos en el campo de la reducción del daño que se están realizando actualmente en varios países desarrollados podrían ser objeto de un mal uso por parte de aquellos que abogan por la legalización de las drogas. (…) En opinión de la Junta, no se puede justificar la legitimidad del uso de estupefacientes bajo la rúbrica de 'reducción del daño '”.

Pero Australia no se dejó intimidar por estas declaraciones. El delegado australiano replicó que las medidas de reducción del daño representaban el factor clave de la estrategia de su país. Dichas medidas estaban empezando a aplicarse sin que se diera la condición previa de la eliminación del uso indebido de las drogas. Si bien era posible que este tipo de estrategias no resultaran idóneas para todos los países, era innegable que había logrado resultados muy positivos en la reducción de los problemas sociales, económicos y sanitarios en Australia. La Sesión Especial de la Asamblea General prevista para 1998 brindaría “ una excelente oportunidad para determinar si era necesario introducir mejoras en las estructuras establecidas con miras a aumentar su eficacia en la batalla de la comunidad internacional contra los estupefacientes ”.

Los Países Bajos defendieron su pragmática postura nacional ante el cannabis. Teniendo en cuenta que las estrategias hasta el momento no resultaban ni realistas ni eficaces, la solución al problema de la droga sólo podría encontrarse aprendiendo de los errores del pasado. El gobierno neerlandés había abordado la cuestión desde diversos puntos de vista, muchos de ellos innovadores, y con algunos se habían obtenido resultados duraderos. “ Se prestó una especial atención a reducir el uso de drogas duras, ya que el daño que éstas provocan es mucho más grave que el derivado del uso del cannabis. Al separar el mercado de usuarios de drogas blandas del de drogas duras, el número de usuarios de cannabis que se pasaba a las drogas duras resultó sumamente bajo. El principio básico de diferenciar ambos mercados demostró ser muy positivo y el gobierno no inició procesos judiciales en los casos de posesión de pequeñas cantidades de cannabis para consumo personal ”.

Portugal stated that governments should be open to the public debate to find appropriate solutions, especially if there were doubts about the effectiveness of certain measures. The observer of Switzerland said that despite the enormous efforts devoted by the international community to combat the threat of the drug, they had achieved very poor results. "The international community should not give in to disappointment at the setbacks but take the opportunity to analyze strategies for the future criteria and also do it with an open mind who is willing to learn from the experience of others and experience when needed."

These views, however, were only exceptions. In general, the meeting confirmed the predominant discourse. The ECOSOC gave its approval to the report of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, including the recommendation to hold a Special Session of the General Assembly in 1998. Subsequently, the UN Secretary General presented a report to the General Assembly on the possible outcomes of that meeting completely purged of any hint of review. "In the special session could reiterate the importance of treaties on international drug control (...) and confirm its relevance and effectiveness." It would also help "l ograr universal adherence to and implementation before the end of the millennium." Also, the results of the meeting "could lead governments to reaffirm the political importance of drug control and renewed commitment." Finally, the discussions could lead to "globalization and harmonization of the various bilateral and regional approaches" (A/51/469). The preparations for the UNGASS 1998 were launched under the responsibility of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and its various Preparatory Committees in Vienna.

WHO: 'Six Horsemen ride'

Yet as described, there is still another episode in the history of drug control of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs that could not act. The World Health Organization (WHO) plays its own role in policy-making UN drug and it does a relatively independent of the trio that makes up the core of the drug control system and is composed by UNDCP The INCB and CND. This role is limited to recommending which list the conventions of 1961 and 1971 certain substances should be classified attending to their health effects. Precisamente con este fin, la OMS convoca cada dos años un Comité de Expertos en Farmacodependencia. La OMS siempre se ha mostrado en desacuerdo con el sistema de control de drogas establecido, ya que nunca ha comprendido la lógica que se esconde tras la actual distinción entre substancias lícitas e ilícitas. Since its mission is to look only at the impact on health, WHO usually refers to "drugs, including alcohol and snuff." The last two substances pose to the organization major headaches that illicit drugs classified lists of the drug control conventions. For example, according to its own statistics show, the set of all illicit drugs is responsible for the loss of 0.6% of "years of disability-adjusted life" (Disability-Adjusted Life Years, in English), compared to 6.1% caused by alcohol and snuff (WHO, 2001).

When he began the Decade Against Drug Abuse in 1990, WHO created a substance abuse program (Programme on Substance Abuse, or PSA, in English) and appointed six experts on staff to strengthen the contribution of WHO in this field. The British Journal of Addiction welcomed the decision with an editorial entitled "Six Horsemen ride out: WHO is launching a new program on substance abuse." One of the columnists in the magazine celebrated the arrival of PSA "because you can now direct attention to correct the imbalance, far too inclined toward supply reduction and law enforcement, whose practitioners remember, by the force of his belief in the 'evil' of traffickers and of chemicals, one of those honest brokers of justice that condemned so many innocent women to death for witchcraft "(Haworth, 1991). He referred to the historical document entitled Discoverie of Witchcraft (Discovery of Witchcraft), published in 1584 in protest against the rising tide in the persecution of innocents by the superstitious clergy, a book that King James I of England condemned to the stake. Haworth attached great importance to the role of PSA to provide scientific data with which to add some sanity to the drug problem and that "I hope no one would wish to fire." Subsequent events indicate that Haworth was somewhat optimistic.

The enthusiastic PSA team decided to expand the work of the Expert Committee to cover a broader range of issues related to demand reduction. Thus, the 1992 Expert Committee met with two objectives. First, you should review the classification of ten substances and, on the other, we asked experts to study "the various strategies and approaches to reducing substance use and its harmful effects" (WHO, 1993: 1) .

After discussing the traditional practice of chewing coca in the Andes and the use of khat in Africa, the Committee "recommended that studies be conducted to analyze possible changes in the provisions of international control over these traditional patterns of use" (WHO, 1993: 20). In the Committee's report also concluded that the "primary objective of national programs to reduce demand should be to minimize the harm associated with alcohol, snuff and other narcotics. (...) The Committee recommended that for maximum effectiveness, national policies should be oriented to explicitly defined 'harm reduction', both short and long term "(WHO, 1993: 35-36). According to Robin Room, one of the experts who participated in the meeting, this conclusion was reached "not without some grumbling," referring to two other components of the Committee: Hamid Ghodse, who later became president of the INCB, and Philip O. Emafo, also a member of the aforementioned advisory group in 1994 and currently Chairman of the Board. Aún así, al final se sacó adelante el informe, que “ adoptó miras relativamente amplias con respecto a la reducción del daño ya que, por ejemplo, la regulación de la oferta se contemplaba como una de las posibles estrategias a seguir con este fi n” (Room, 1997).

El proyecto sobre cocaína de la OMS

En 1992, el PSA presentó un proyecto sobre cocaína de la OMS y el UNICRI ( WHO/UNICRI Cocaine Project , en inglés) que contaba con fondos procedentes del gobierno italiano y en el que participaba un grupo de destacados investigadores académicos. El UNICRI tiene su sede en Italia y sus siglas son la abreviatura del Instituto Interregional de las Naciones Unidas para Investigaciones sobre la Delincuencia y la Justicia. Los proyectos de investigación se desarrollaron, en parte, como respuesta a la Cumbre Mundial Ministerial sobre Drogas, celebrada en Londres en abril de 1990, con el objetivo de formular políticas de reducción de la demanda y “ combatir la amenaza de la cocaína ”. Según un comunicado de prensa emitido por la OMS en marzo de 1995, el proyecto sobre cocaína fue el mayor estudio a escala mundial realizado hasta el momento sobre el uso de esta substancia. Se recopiló información en 22 ciudades y en 19 países sobre cuestiones como el uso de la cocaína y de otros derivados de la hoja de coca, sus usuarios, sus efectos sobre éstos y sobre la comunidad, así como sobre la respuesta de los gobiernos ante esta problemática. Se abordaron todos los aspectos del problema: desde los masticadores de hojas de coca en los Andes a los fumadores de crack en Nueva York y Lagos, pasando por los usuarios que se inyectan cocaína en São Paulo y San Francisco o los que la esnifan en Sydney y El Cairo. El comunicado de prensa también aclaraba que “ las a veces imprevistas conclusiones del estudio no reflejan la posición oficial de la OMS ” (WHO, 1995).

En la reunión de la Comisión de Estupefacientes de marzo de 1995 se difundió un dossier informativo en que se resumían los resultados del estudio (WHO/UNICRI, 1995). En él, cabía encontrar conclusiones como las siguientes:

Most participating countries agree that occasional use of cocaine does not necessarily lead to serious social problems or physical or mild. (...) In all participating countries, are major health problems arising from the use of legal substances, particularly alcohol and snuff, that the use of cocaine. (...) The consumption of coca leaves does not appear to cause adverse health effects and, instead, has a therapeutic function, positive social ritual and indigenous Andean communities. (...) WHO / PSA should investigate the therapeutic effects of the coca leaf.

"Most authorities consider that the eradication of the use of cocaine and other drugs is an unrealistic goal. However, if use of these substances is prolonged, the negative effects of such use need not be inevitable. In most participating countries, a minority of the population that starts in the use of cocaine or related products, use them occasionally for a certain period of time and suffer the negative consequences for it are absent or mild even years after use. This suggests that it is possible to reduce if not eliminate, the harmful use of cocaine. "

"The biggest question posed by the future is whether international organizations such as WHO and UNDCP and national governments continue to focus on measures to reduce supply, such as destruction and crop substitution and law enforcement, given the critical and growing cynicism about the efficacy of these approaches. Countries such as Australia, Bolivia, Canada and Colombia are interested in studying a number of possibilities to legalize and decriminalize the use and personal possession of cocaine and related products. Should be evaluated in greater detail the negative effects of current policies and strategies and develop alternative approaches. (...) National and local approaches at this time, providing an over-emphasis on punitive control measures may actually contribute to the development of health-related problems. "

As the briefing began circulating through the halls of the UN, U.S. officials used their great influence to prevent the publication of the study. "The U.S. government has been surprised to note that the study seems to make the case for the positive use of cocaine," was the response from Neil Boyer, the representative of the United States in the 48 th session of the World Health Assembly in Geneva. Argued that the WHO program on substance abuse was "headed in the wrong direction" and "undermined the efforts of the international community to eradicate the illicit cultivation and production of coca." He reported that there were "indications of support from WHO programs for harm reduction and previous WHO collaborations with organizations that supported the legalization of drugs." And then clear threat that "if WHO activities in drugs fail to reinforce proven approaches to drug control, the funds will be cut to the appropriate programs" (WHA48/1995/REC/3 ).

Patricia Erickson, a professor at the University of Toronto who participated in the study as a researcher, defended the integrity of this:

"The original team consisted of a number of experts whose investigations into the cocaine had been scientifically proven, received funding, had been published and had passed the peer assessment by other scientists. That is, the usual rules were followed in these cases. Of course, many of the results have completely contradicted the image of cocaine as a drug killer who enslaves people. This idea is typical of the mythology of the 20's. There is no denying that cocaine can cause problems and that is cause for concern, but concluded that people who work and engage in other activities could make it a recreational use. The study was not intended to give a bad image of cocaine, but delve into the full spectrum of use in various countries "(Taylor Martin, 2001).

The peer evaluation is a fundamental and usual procedures of any studies conducted or sponsored by WHO. In the 48 th session of the General Assembly, Mr. Boyer asked the Office of the Director General, Mr. Skin, "which should be some way for peer evaluation of the study was carried out by persons who are recognized as true experts in the research field, in accordance with the strict rules of WHO in this area "(WHA48/1995/REC/3). Although the project coordinator on cocaine, Mario Argandoña, had asked Hans Emblad, head of the PSA, to refrain from making public any version of the report in the arena of drug control until it had completed the peer assessment procedures, Mr. Emblad considered it appropriate to report at the session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs of 1995 on the interesting results of the investigation, which led to the intervention of the United States.

The project secretariat issued several lists containing several names of potential supervisors who were here and there for over two years. It was impossible to reach agreement on who should take over the task and, therefore, never took the final decision on the project. Although some of the experts of the study could publish some of his research, most of the results of the project on cocaine UNICRI WHO and never surfaced. That's how hundreds of pages containing valuable facts and opinions on coca and cocaine, the fruit of three years of more than 40 researchers and consultants, finally ended "on hoguer a".

The project on cannabis WHO

The PSA began the WHO project on risk factors associated with the use of cannabis (WHO Project on Health Implications of Cannabis, in English) in 1993. WHO has published its latest report on cannabis and 12 years ago, in response to "numerous requests" to conduct a new study, the organization appointed a group of scientific experts on the subject (WHO/MSA/PSA/97.4 : 1). It was agreed that one of the research subjects would then carry out a "Comparative evaluation of physical and psychological consequences from the use of alcohol, cannabis, nicotine and opiates." The report, published in August 1995, concluded: "Considering the patterns of use, cannabis is a public health problem for much less than that of alcohol and snuff in Western societies" (Hall, 1995).

According to one researcher, some WHO officials "went crazy" when reading the report (New Scientist, 1998). In a press release, WHO defended its decision to abolish the comparative conclusion of the final report arguing that there was "no attempt to conceal information and the decision not to include this comparison in the final report was based on scientific criteria unconnected s some political pressures "(WHO, 1998). The final report, published in 1997, included the following comment on the controversial comparing cannabis with alcohol and snuff:

"The expert group which prepared the revision of knowledge on cannabis in 1985 included a section in the draft report that it intended to compare the evidence on the health consequences of cannabis risks to the health of a number of licit and illegal as alcohol, snuff and opiates. However, the reliability and public health significance of such comparisons is questionable. (...) The quantitative risks of cannabis use is a big unknown because of lack of reliable epidemiological studies and, therefore, these comparisons tend to be more speculative than scientific "(WHO / MSA/PSA/97.4: 29 ).

The World Drug Report 1997

In late 1996, had managed to neutralize the positions and most controversial recommendations of previous years. Probably why, to lobby advocate of "zero tolerance" does not it funny to see how some of these ideas re-emerged in the World Drug Report of the UN in 1997. The report, prepared under the auspices of UNDCP, reflected in many ways more open climate that characterized the period leading up to the UNGASS and showed the initiatives taken by WHO and the PSA to rationalize the debate.

On the controversy of cannabis, for example, the report notes:

"It is undeniable that in some people and the type of use, cannabis causes problems in the physical and mental health, for example, loss of short-term memory, loss of concentration, motor problems, bronchial and lung, etc. . Moreover, such use does not present the same patterns of continuous use long term or dependent as cigarette smoking and there is a mortality rate directly attributed to the cumulative effects of cannabis. " The report concludes that "(a) in the context of illicit drugs, it seems the least harmful and (b) for a number of reasons, perhaps related to its status as a prohibited drug, health and social costs arising from their use have been far less harmful than snuff and alcohol "(UNDCP, 1997).

He devoted an entire chapter to "Discussion on regulation and legalization" (UNDCP, 1997: pp.184-201), written with the intention - as mentioned on the back - to go "beyond the rhetoric that often accompanies this subject:

"Over the past years have seen growing criticism that the funds for the 'war on drugs' has been wasted and that the drug control regime, instead of promoting the health and welfare of nations, could have aggravated the situation. (...) The feeling of having reached an impasse in the field of drug policy has led to the emergence of many pressure groups that claim a change in the international drug control that would soften the prohibition regime - for example, modifying existing conventions on drug control - and more emphasis on measures to reduce the harm associated with drug abuse. Since these groups are of heterogeneous origin and are composed of researchers, politicians, scientists, doctors, economists and leading opinion leaders, driven mostly by serious motivation and founded, represent a major challenge to current thinking on drug control. "

While no legalization as a priority, the chapter breaks with many of the prejudices prevailing in the debate and seeks smooth opposing positions. "The debate about regulation has deviated from its proper course due to excessive extremism on the one hand, the advocacy group 'zero tolerance' and, on the other, the legalizers." The World Drug Report had noted the wide range of political possibilities, saying: "The law - including international conventions - are not immutable and may change if the democratic will of nations so wishes". "

Strengthening the UN mechanism

The first of a series of conflicts during the period prior to the UNGASS emerged already in the first Preparatory Committee meeting in Vienna in March 1997. At one point on the agenda called 'Application of international treaties on drug control', several countries - Australia, Mexico, South Africa, Sweden and Thailand - had a resolution on "strengthening the United Nations mechanism for the control international drugs. " The draft resolution recognizes that there is a high rate of abuse, cultivation, production and distribution of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and drug trafficking, an index, as well as high, was steadily increasing. For this reason, it was necessary to conduct a comprehensive review of drug control mechanism exists. It requested the Secretary-General to "appoint a small group of independent experts to undertake a general review on how they have evolved the efforts against illicit drugs within the United Nations system and in order to formulate measures to strengthen international cooperation against illicit drugs in the future "(E/CN.7/1997/L.6/Rev.1).

Both the U.S. and the UK disapproved of the word "independent", so the final version referred to "a small group of experts selected after appropriate consultations with, among other governments." Moreover, in the final version clarified that the "strengthening of the UN mechanism" should be "in the context of existing international treaties on drug control." A year later, in March 1998, the Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed a group of thirteen "high-level experts." In fact, the committee was made by the board to complete the Preparatory Committee and some other national delegates (UNIS/NAR/627). After its first meeting in April, the group prepared a report on progress towards the UNGASS and after another two sessions, their results during the session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs in March 1999 (E/CN.7 / 1999/5).

As a side note, the group considered:

"... But to determine whether a treaty was or was not appropriate was not his concern, there were several key issues affecting the international system of drug control that needed to be addressed as a priority. One such issue was the Commission's ability to perform the functions entrusted treaties. The Panel noted that the Commission had not yet dealt with some fundamental issues of drug control which had been widely covered in the media, including the implementation of projects on the prescription of heroin to drug addicts and the change in how society views drug abuse and increased tolerance. "

Despite his limited room for maneuver and the absence of independent members outside the United Nations system, the thirteen members of the group pointed out certain deficiencies in the functioning. For example, agreed that the action plan of UN control of drug abuse had not achieved its objectives, as was highlighted during a recent evaluation at all favorable. It also recommended increased cooperation between UNDCP, UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) and UNAIDS. With regard to the functioning of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, the group felt: "In recent years the Commission has tended to stop being a technical entity to become a more political organization. (...) The issues of drug control, critical or growing, not properly addressed, in part because of the way it was structured the work program of the Commission. The situation was gradually undermining the Commission's role as the principal organ of the United Nations policy on drug control. " As a result, during the years after more meetings were held between the sessions, increased coordination between donor and recipient countries of UNDCP and incorporated "thematic discussions" to the ordinary session of the Commission Drugs to promote a more focused and substantive discussion on key policy issues.

UNGASS 1988: the commitment

The Preparatory Committee met in March 1997 had to decide which country would assume the presidency. Mexico, which had played a key role in organizing the Special Session, he ran with the support of GRULAC bloc of Latin American and the Caribbean. The United States, however, felt some concern about the critical tone that Mexico had taken recently. So they seized the resignation, barely a month, General Gutierrez Rebollo, known as the "drug czar" of Mexico prompted by allegations that had been protecting Amado Carrillo Fuentes, the major Mexican drug trafficker (Fazio, 1997) . Under the guise of widespread corruption in the Mexican drug organizations, the U.S. prevented the nomination of Mexico. And only after hours of negotiations between racks agreement was reached to support the presidency of Portugal.

Mexico remained a prominent role during the preparations for the UNGASS chairing the intergovernmental panel charged with preparing the draft of the Guidelines for reducing drug demand, one of the key documents in the agenda of the UNGASS. Mexico also submitted draft texts on issues such as money laundering and chemical precursors. The objective of Mexico, in the words of the UN permanent representative of that country in Vienna, was to adapt the international regime to control drug demand reduction to have more importance "thus balancing strategy that previously was biased towards a aspect of the problem "(Lajous Vargas, 1998).

It was hoped that the UNGASS would mark the end of the "time to point fingers." As indicated by the Colombian President Ernesto Samper in his address to the Special Session: "No one is without sin to cast the first stone." Both Mexico and Colombia highlighted that should end the old dichotomy between producer and consumer countries traditionally giving way to the principle of "shared responsibility". This principle, in his opinion, should become the cornerstone of international drug control and for that, not only had to admit past imbalances, but also that the traditional boundaries were blurred over time. After a series of tough negotiations, focusing on questions of demand reduction and precursor chemicals, the final outcome of the UNGASS reflected the atmosphere that is breathed. At least, in essence. Many of the approved documents emphasize the responsibility of the "North" to, among other things, reduce demand, regulate trade in precursor chemicals, control the production of amphetamine-type stimulants (EA) and address issues such as money laundering .

The main impediment to achieving this new balance arose from a proposal by Pino Arlacchi, who was appointed new Executive Director of UNDCP during the preparation process, in September 1997. His plan SCOPE, which stands for English correspond to the Strategy for the Elimination of Coca and Poppy, intended to eradicate these crops in a period of ten years, ie, for 2008, and urged to do so in Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, Burma, Laos, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Pakistan, the eight countries that together account for the production of coca and opium (Blickman, 1998). SCOPE The plan raised the discourse on a "drug free world" through the total elimination of cultures associated with them, and would have returned the burden of responsibility to countries producing opium and coca.

Although the plan was never approved, provided the impetus for adopting the most controversial section of the UNGASS Political Declaration: Article 19 which calls for "eliminating or significantly reducing the illicit cultivation of coca bush, the cannabis plant and poppy by the year 2008 "(A/RES/S-20/2). After heated debate, agreed to be fixed in the same year as the deadline for "eliminating or significantly reducing the manufacturing, marketing and trafficking of psychotropic substances, including synthetic drugs and precursor chemicals" and to "achieve significant and measurable results in the field of demand reduction by 2008. " These are the items contained in the agenda for the midterm review of April 2003: "review progress made ​​and obstacles encountered" when we meet halfway the deadline for 2008.

During the Special Session, few delegates who continued to express doubts about the fragile consensus that hard-to reach. Raymond Kendall, Secretary General of Interpol, said: "Although the application of the law is the reason for Interpol, we do not as a panacea for all ills associated with drug problems." He stressed the need for new policies that act specifically on the factors leading to the emergence and development of so-called abnormal behavior. This would involve addressing risk reduction programs seriously and consciousness from the perspective of public health required. He added that "a new policy should not be so naive as to confuse reality with faith and demagogic from objective and multidisciplinary research." Similarly, the foreign minister of the Netherlands, Hans van Mierlo, stressed the need to initiate strategies based on new findings: "The first thing we should do would be to assess the results of our efforts thus far to discern what it really works. Let us not be cornered by the ideological debates of the past to explore future strategies. Let's stick to facts instead we observed from our practice in recent years "(A/S-20/PV.1-9).

However, since the UNGASS held in 1988, have not taken too many initiatives in this regard. The PSA program of WHO was dismantled and merged again in 2000 with the Department of Mental Health who had separated in 1990. Pino Arlacchi, Executive Director of UNDCP, criticized much of the World Drug Report 2000. The chapter on regulation, which should be a continuation of 1997, disappeared altogether. The coordinator, Francisco Thoumi, left the agency expressing their protest. "Arlacchi was very concerned because the original draft did not reflect his vision of the drug situation in the world. He felt that was too pessimistic and that did not show recent progress in the fight against drugs. I used to argue that the world drug problem was about to be solved and they were only three countries which posed a real problem: Colombia, Afghanistan and Burma "(Thoumi, 2002). Of UNDCP staff was forced to leave the agency or resigned over differences with Arlacchi. There was a purge - not to mention witch hunts - to cleanse the system of drug control anything UN supposedly "defeatist" that could break the 'spirit of unity'.

Conclusions

The operation itself based on the consensus of the control mechanism of the UN drug has led to curious situations. "Illicit drugs may be the most paradoxical. Irrational behavior that, in principle, should show the people who use them is sometimes typical of many who do not "(Grinspoon, 1993). In his heart, "most authorities consider that the drug eradication is an unrealistic goal" and that the current system lacks the necessary effectiveness. But as soon took seats in the conference rooms of Vienna and New York, climb on the bandwagon of consensus and majority of the representatives is carried away by the usual rhetoric while the minority tries to pass as unnoticed as possible. So, after a decade of high-level conferences during which it was agreed that "the evil spreads quicker than the cure", slows any initiative to "identify the causes of the inefficiency of this system of control." The results of scientific studies sponsored by the UN have deliberately neglected and any initiative to make 'changes to be made' is blowing in the wind. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the international community gathered in 1988 concluded that it could get in 10 years what had not been achieved in the 25 to set a deadline in the 1961 Convention.

The INCB said already in its 1994 report: "The international community has expressed the wish that, instead of reopening the debates, prefers to develop common strategies defined and extend its principles to establish how to strengthen measures drug control "(E/INCB/1994/1/Sup.1: 8). No matter if the strategy does not provide positive results as long as the international community to show greater commitment: "We hope that next year, unlike the latter, we can speak of real progress." "Any doubt, hesitation or undue review of the validity of the objectives to be achieved would undermine our commitment." The many appeals - from the very "international community" - to "analyze strategies for the future criteria and also do it with an open mind who is willing to learn from past lessons and experience when necesari or" have met with accusations Manichean - typical of the Cold War - on the betrayal of "our noble cause."

Therefore, it is not surprising that "civil society shows a growing impacienci a", as rightly noted by the Secretary General. The results of the UNGASS review, to be held in April 2003, will undoubtedly become, as predicted by the Chairman of the Session, "the litmus test to demonstrate the responsiveness of the international community to the complex problems after the end of the Cold War. " To pass the test, it might be a good idea to retake some of the initiatives of the period before the UNGASS and re-added to the agenda. Circumstances have changed considerably since then and, at present, different conclusions could be reached:

(1) Five years, and despite the renewed political commitment at UNGASS, there has been no progress in terms of consumption and production. Ministers would be in utter ridiculous if, at the April meeting, be limited to still claim that by 2008 will have achieved "eliminating or significantly reducing" the cultivation of coca, poppy and cannabis and synthetic drugs production.

(2) La Oficina contra la Droga y el Delito de la ONU (ODC, siglas en inglés) está experimentando un proceso de reforma emprendido por su nuevo director ejecutivo, Antonio Costa, que permitirá a la agencia despedirse de la crisis de los últimos años y de la censura impuesta por su predecesor. Puede que ello amplíe la capacidad del PNUFID, que se enmarca dentro de la ODC, para ejercer su función como “ centro de investigación ” animando el debate político sobre las drogas en el ámbito internacional.

(3) En el Plan de Acción desarrollado para aplicar la Declaración sobre los principios rectores de la reducción de la demanda de drogas de la UNGASS, los países se comprometieron a ofrecer “ todo el espectro de servicios, incluida la reducción de las consecuencias perjudiciales para la sociedad y la salud del uso indebido de drogas ” (A/RES/54/132). El drama del SIDA en todo el mundo ha puesto de relieve la necesidad de tomar medidas de reducción del riesgo para afrontar la propagación del virus relacionada con el uso de drogas por vía intravenosa. La Declaración de compromiso en la lucha contra el VIH/SIDA adoptada por la UNGASS en junio de 2001 insta explícitamente a las naciones a garantizar para 2005 un mayor acceso a equipo esterilizado para inyecciones, ya fomentar “actividades para la reducción de los daños causados por el consumo de drogas” (A/RES/S-26/2: art. 52). Así pues, resulta imposible – además de irresponsable – seguir evitando un debate abierto sobre el concepto de reducción del daño en el ámbito de la Comisión de Estupefacientes.

(4) Varios países han relajado sus leyes sobre el cannabis y en toda Europa y el Canadá se están desarrollando debates más objetivos sobre la posibilidad de la despenalización y la legalización. Este clima político vuelve a plantear en el ámbito de la ONU las tradicionales dudas acerca de las incoherencias en los tratados sobre el cannabis y la coca. Tal como ya se señaló en 1971, el cannabis “ no forma parte – y, objetivamente, nunca lo hizo – de las disposiciones de un tratado cuyo objetivo explícito consiste en prevenir la 'adicción a los estupefacientes.' La inclusión del cannabis en un tratado sobre estupefacientes fue una equivocación debida a los datos médicos y científicos erróneos de que disponían los delegados cuando se preparó el proyecto del tratado ” (Leinwand, 1971).

Aunque la historia presentada en este artículo atestigua los límites del funcionamiento racional del mecanismo de control de drogas de la ONU , estos últimos acontecimientos podrían crear las condiciones necesarias para que un grupo de países con ideas afines puedan acabar con la actual parálisis. El ministro de exteriores George Papandreou anunció una iniciativa tomada por la presidencia griega de la UE en ese sentido: “ El primer paso para encontrar nuevas maneras de abordar el problema de las drogas debería consistir en una evaluación exhaustiva de los tratados internacionales en esta materia. Debemos verificar su eficacia, poner al descubierto sus puntos débiles y presentar propuestas con miras a encontrar otros métodos para formular y aplicar las políticas sobre drogas ” (Papandreou, 2002).

Reconocimientos

El autor desea expresar su agradecimiento al Fondo Europeo para Políticas de Drogas NEF, por el apoyo financiero brindado al Transnational Institute durante el período de investigación y redacción de este documento.

Martin Jelsma
TNI , enero de 2003

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