... From Mexico in drug war

By Ted Galen Carpenter

Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president of defense studies and foreign policy at the Cato Institute, is author of six books on foreign policy, including Bad Neighbor Policy is told: Washington's Futile War on Drugs in Latin America, Palgrave / Macmillan, 2003. This study was originally published on November 15, 2005 (Cato Institute Foreign Policy Briefing No. 87). You can also read this document in PDF format here .

Executive Summary

Mexico is a major supplier of heroin, marijuana and methamphetamine to the U.S. market, and also is the main traffic and distribution of cocaine from South America. For years there, both inside and outside Mexico, the fear that this country be swept away corruption and violence that plagues Colombia, the main producer of drugs in the Western Hemisphere. Today, there are increasing signs that the "Colombianization" of Mexico is becoming a reality.

This dramatic scene is a direct result of Washington's policy to prohibit illegal drugs since the prohibitive strategies create a huge black market conducive to illegal drug trafficking by its very nature. On the other hand, the possibility of winning big money attracts more violent criminal elements. It is true that when drugs are illegal, only those who are trafficked out of the Law

If Mexico is on the same path as Colombia, the consequences for the United States will be much more severe. Colombia is relatively far from the United States, but Mexico is a bordering country and closely linked economically by the Free Trade Agreement of North America. The chaos in Mexico is already crossing the border and adversely affect the United States, especially the southwestern states.

There is still time for Mexico to stop and reverse the process of "Colombianization" but for this to happen, Washington must change its policies drastically. For over three and a half decades, the U.S. waged a tough war on drugs that generated major social pathologies both internally and externally. It is time to rethink the strategy of prohibition in its entirety.

Introduction

For many years, the U.S. drug policy in the Western Hemisphere focused on eradicating illegal drugs from major producing countries: Peru, Bolivia and Colombia 1. Washington is especially concerned about Colombia, where insurgent groups on the far left we have used the drug trade to finance their armed struggle against the government in Bogota. For Washington, the worst case scenario was the emergence of a state drug dealer allied with extremist political elements and terrorist organizations. The Bush administration seems quite concerned about this possibility, as it plans to continue offering its vast Bogota counternarcotics aid for many years.

Fears of Colombia are not unfounded, though the government of President Alvaro Uribe has managed to weaken the main insurgent groups in recent years. However, U.S. authorities policymakers have a problem brewing closer: in Mexico. The importance of the drug trade in Mexico increased sharply in the last decade. In 1999, Thomas Constantine, then head of the Directorate of Drugs Control Agency (DEA, for its acronym in English), told Congress that Mexican traffickers had increased "in a virtually geometric" in the previous five years and corruption "unparalleled" affected the entire country 2. From the time of those statements, things have worsened substantially.

Today, Mexico is a major supplier of heroin to the U.S. market, and also the main traffic and distribution point for cocaine from South America 3. In fact, there is evidence that organizations engaged in drug business have used the profits from the control of trafficking routes its Colombian partners, over the years to wrest control of the entire trade. "Today, Mexicans have taken control of organized crime, who now head-and take the bulk of the money," says John Walters (the drug czar in the White House), director of the Office for National Policy Control of U.S. Drug 4. In fact, there is evidence that Mexican drug cartels are playing an even greater role in the South American drug producers, and that they are moving more and more Colombian traffickers 5.

Both inside and outside of Mexico, lies the fear that this country be swept away corruption and violence that plagues Colombia for some time. In fact, today, Mexicans speak openly of the "Colombianization" of their country 6.

It is true that Mexico faces a political extremist insurgency on a large scale as affecting Colombia. No doubt this is an important difference, because it implies that no significant anti-American political forces to exploit the illegal drug trade to finance their cause. However, there are more similarities than differences between the situation in Colombia and Mexico, and Washington was slow to react to this disturbing reality.

Unstable alliances and violence on the rise

One consequence of the Mexican cartels have become so important is the outbreak of violence. While there are about a dozen organizations dedicated to drug trafficking in Mexico, there are four particularly powerful groups: the Gulf cartel, led by Osiel Cardenas, the Sinaloa cartel led by Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman, the Tijuana Cartel, managed long by the Arellano Felix family, and the Juarez cartel, led by Vicente Carrillo. These groups are fighting among themselves and with agencies of the security forces for control of access corridors to the lucrative U.S. market.

There are signs that last year, the Gulf cartel in Tijuana and joined forces to combat the Sinaloa cartel, which had sought to extend its involvement in trafficking. To a lesser extent, the new allies also fought to resist the incursions of the Juarez cartel 7. Power struggles were fierce. One day in February, especially bloody, they found the bodies of 12 men, over 130 kilometers of highway in the state of Sinaloa, between the capital, Culiacan and Mazatlan famous spa 8. What happened in Sinaloa may have been an extreme case, but in 2005, hundreds of people died in violence related to less spectacular drug trafficking, and there is evidence that the killing would stop.

For some time, the main killers of the various posters come, increasingly, of what once was an elite force of the Mexican army: Panel Air Mobile Force. These renegade former miliary, known as "Los Zetas", were originally sent to the U.S. border to combat drug trafficking. Instead of fighting against drugs, many of them became murderers under the command of the posters 9. Mary Anastasia O'Grady, editor of the column "America" ​​The Wall Street Journal, describes the tactics of the Zetas. O'Grady describes are often involved in extrajudicial killings that mimic rival trafficking organizations, but stresses that the Zetas have other features and dealing with more general issues.

The Zetas are also known for the way they intimidate police and municipal officials and extortion practices against local firms. Its success depends in large measure, the terror they generate in the population, which explains why the murders have become public events. This demonstrates that viciousness is not always greed that abide by the conditions imposed by traffickers. It may also be a matter of life or death for officers and their families 10.

This pattern exhibits a disturbing resemblance to the situation in Colombia, particularly during the outbreak of violence related to drug trafficking in the late 80's and 90's. There, too, bullying was a key objective of the posters, all objective successfully achieved. For example, a number of Colombian governments did not obey orders extradition of drug lords issued by the United States. The posters made it clear that one of his top priorities was to thwart the extradition, and that legislators and other officials who defied in this field risking their lives.

The scandal of Nuevo Laredo

The worst case of violence and corruption in Mexico occurred in the northern border city of Nuevo Laredo, a city of 350,000 across the Rio Grande in Laredo, Texas. Of the 850 homicides last year, Mexican authorities violence attributed to drug-trafficking, 228 occurred in Nuevo Laredo or the surrounding state of Tamaulipas 11. Violence and police corruption reached such a level there in early June that the national government of Mexico suspended the entire Nuevo Laredo police force and sent federal police to patrol the streets 12. The murder of the new police chief of Nuevo Laredo, on June 8, just hours after his appointment, was for the administration of President Vicente Fox, the straw that broke the camel 13.

After this event, federal authorities proceeded to purge the police force of the city. After requiring a polygraph test, were sacked 305 of the 765 police officers. In addition, 41 of them were arrested by federal police attack when it came to town. The "new and improved" Nuevo Laredo police again take to the streets in late July with a new uniform of white shirt. Mexican officials said the target was chosen in order to symbolize that this was a new and reliable entity 14. Apparently, these agents were responsible.

Beyond the question as to whether the local police purge generate any lasting benefit, the transfer of the force at the federal police had no significant impact on the records of violence in Nuevo Laredo. In fact, the number of homicides related to drug trafficking increased during that period.

The situation remained extremely violent, even since the restoration of the local police force. In mid-August, Michael Yoder, the U.S. consul general in Nuevo Laredo said: "The feeling in Nuevo Laredo is total impunity" 15. In late July, after a particularly violent incident in which gang rival traffickers engaged in a firefight using high-powered rifles, 16 rocket-propelled grenades and bazookas, Tony Garza, U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, closed the consulate in Nuevo Laredo one week.

Corruption spreads

The scandal of police of Nuevo Laredo is just one example of rampant corruption of the political system and police of Mexico. Many of the most famous episodes of violent power struggles in the drug-even one on the outskirts of the seaside resort of Cancun, took center stage to police officers in service or retired. In March 2005, prosecutors charged 27 state police, federal and local gangs of leading or collaborating with the murder of other officers 17. In another case, a state police commander and 12 other agents of the state of Chihuahua were arrested for killing 11 people near Ciudad Juarez. "Instead of protecting and ensuring the security of the population, working explicitly for organized crime," accused the Attorney General of Justice of Mexico 18.

During the last decade, there were many other similar episodes of police involvement in drug trafficking. In February 2000, the Tijuana police chief was assassinated: this was the second time there was a crime of such features in less than six years. A short time later, seven men, two of whom were former members of the Tijuana police force were arrested for the murder. The men confessed to working for the Sinaloa cartel. In another incident, there was a bloody shootout in downtown Tijuana, when police tried to stop the armed motorcade of a smuggler. His bodyguards killed the commander of the police unit and three officers. It was later discovered that these bodyguards were local police officers 19.

The Fox administration has made every effort to take exemplary action against the policemen captured by drug cartels. More than 700 officers were charged with various offenses ranging from taking bribes from the cartels, to participating in kidnappings and drug-related murders. One of the most resonant is former state police chief of Ciudad Juarez, under investigation for murder 20. However, most informed observers believe that the police arrested are just the tip of an enormous iceberg of corruption.

Corruption is not a new phenomenon of the Fox administration for over ten years, the national police chief was arrested with $ 2.4 million in the trunk of his car. Later, he was sentenced for having given more than $ 20 million to another government official to buy protection from one of the most notorious traffickers in Mexico 21. However, the most embarrassing incident, perhaps, is the one that occurred in the mid 90's, when President Ernesto Zedillo appointed General Jose de Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo as new anti-narcotics czar. The general seemed to have excellent references in the fight against drugs, since he had personally carried out an offensive against the Sinaloa cartel leader. U.S. officials received the appointment of Gutierrez Rebollo with enthusiasm. Barry McCaffrey, U.S. drug czar, praised him: "You enjoy a reputation for unimpeachable integrity (...) It is a very serious person" 22. Three months later, the Mexican government announced that its new Tsar was in a maximum security prison, accused of accepting bribes to protect drug dealer up the country. Indeed, the general had been very tough on drug trafficking ... that is, with organizations competing with the sign of his client.

The passage of time has done little to reduce corruption of military force in Mexico. In April 2003, for example, three military officers, among whom was a brigadier general, were convicted of taking bribes from one of the cartels to protect drug shipments destined for the U.S. 23. However, an episode that was relatively unimportant when compared with the one that occurred last year. In October 2002, more than 600 members of Battalion 65 of the Army, located in Sinaloa, were investigated for ties to drug trafficking organizations and to protect poppy fields, opium and marijuana. The problem of corruption was found to be so widespread that the authorities dissolved the battalion 24.

Also, it is clear that corruption is spreading in the national prison system. This year, there was evidence showing that some of the most powerful leaders of drug trafficking in the country have led their organizations from prison who were supposedly high security 25. According to officials of the security forces and Mexican Americans, the struggle being waged in Nuevo Laredo is between Guzman, the Sinaloa cartel (who escaped from a maximum security prison in 2001 in a laundry truck), and Cardenas, Gulf cartel leader, still locked in a prison near Mexico City 26.

The power of drug trafficking organizations generates fear throughout the country. In addition, perceived concerns about the possibility that some bloodthirsty gangs have been proposed to assassinate President Fox, why it was necessary to increase the safety of the agent 27.

Currently, it is possible to ensure that there is any Mexican institution completely free from stain of the drug trade. It has been argued, even the Catholic Church received contributions while recognizing that came from traffickers. Just two years ago, research on money laundering by the Fox administration included inquiries about the role of the Church. During the course of the investigation, was required to Guadalajara Cardinal Juan Sandoval to appear with their bank documents 28. Bishop Ramon Godinez, the central state of Aguascalientes, caused an uproar in early October 2005, when he admitted that there were frequent donations from drug dealers, and argued that it was the responsibility of the Church to investigate the source of donations. "The fact that the money has been misappropriated does not mean you have to burn it," Godinez said. "What you need to do is to change (...)". The bishop said the money is "purified" once passed through the doors of the parish 29.

The impact on U.S.

For those who have studied the impact of the drug trade in Colombia over the past two decades, all this is familiar. Now another Colombian pattern begins to emerge in Mexico: the branching of the activities of drug gangs, which also begin to engage in kidnapping and other lucrative work. This is what turned Colombia into the world capital of kidnappings in recent years. Today, the same phenomenon tends to be felt in Mexico. Recent reports suggest that today the problem of kidnappings in Mexico may be more severe than in Colombia 30. Some U.S. citizens traveling in Mexico were victims of kidnapping 31. The danger has reached an alarming level as in January 2005, the Department of State of the United States issued a warning to travelers, urging citizens to take all possible precautions when traveling to northern Mexico, much to the chagrin of Mexican government 32.

U.S. officials already signs that violence related to drug trafficking in Mexico do not respect borders. According to John Walters, drug czar, "The killing of rival traffickers and cross the border, and witnesses were murdered. We do not consider the border to protect us "33. A Dallas narcotics officer has reached a similar conclusion: "There is an alarming number of incidents that show the same kind of violence so prevalent in Mexico, but here in Dallas. There are performances that simulate murders, burned bodies and chaos (...) It seems that the power struggles being waged in Mexico have come to Dallas' 34. Even the normally sedate Strategy Report International Narcotics Control, Department of State, admits that "the violence of warring Mexican cartels has spread and crossed the border that separates Mexico from the United States" 35. Perhaps even more disturbing are the indications that Zeta hit squads have crossed the border and are settled in U.S. cities, hidden in the booming Hispanic immigrant communities 36.

The growing violence plaguing the border between Mexico and the United States prompted the governors of Arizona and New Mexico, Bill Richardson and Janet Napolitano, declared a state of emergency in mid August 2005 37. Moreover, several powerful political constituencies exerting increasing pressure on California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, for it to do the same. It is true that violence related to drug trafficking was not the only factor that led to Napolitano and Richardson to take this step, since the problems associated with the entry of illegal immigrants were a reason at least equally important. However, it is clear that both political leaders were uneasy with the possibility that the disorder of the struggles between traffickers in Mexico pierce the border. It would be tragic corruption and violence that beset Colombia for both too absorbed to Mexico. Such a situation would mean a major concern for the United States. Colombia is reasonably far, but Mexico is our neighbor next door, and a major economic partner in the Free Trade in North America. The chaos in that country would have an inevitable effect on U.S. citizens, particularly the inhabitants of the southwestern states. In some respects, the impact is already a fact 38.

The ban on drugs and Mexico's problem

Not surprisingly, Mexico go towards becoming the next Colombia. The global trade in illegal drugs is a huge business opportunity, conservatively estimated at 300,000 million dollars per year, the main retail market is U.S. and Mexico is an essential participant only in Mexico, drug trafficking is an industry multi 39. In fact, the relative importance of the drug trade in Mexico's economy may be approaching the level of importance of the illicit trade in the economy of Colombia. One can only hope that the drug trade in Mexico does not grow to the point that has grown in Afghanistan. There, this business is two-thirds of all legal economic output 40. So far, Mexico has not reached that level calamitous, but trade is profitable enough to rival gangs are willing to do whatever is necessary to obtain or maintain control of trade.

U.S. policy seems to assume that if the Mexican government can eliminate the top leaders of drug trafficking, their organizations will be dissolved and, therefore, greatly reducing the flow of illegal drugs in America. Thus, U.S. officials welcomed the willingness of President Fox to prioritize drug war, and especially the capture of major drug trafficking figures 41. Since Fox took office in 2000, were arrested in Mexico more than 36 000 drug dealers, among them were some top figures of almost all the posters 42. This assumption that, to neutralize the drug lords would achieve a lasting reduction in activity is similar to that adopted by the U.S. authorities when they took industrial action against the Medellin and Cali cartels of Colombia in the 90's. However, subsequent events disproved this theory. All that was achieved by removing the posters was to decentralize the Colombian drug trade. Instead of two large organizations which controlled the trade, today there are about 300 groups, much smaller and less organized.

To put it more concisely, arrests and killings of numerous leaders traffickers in Colombia and Mexico, over the years, had no significant effect on the quantity of drugs entering the United States. When cutting a Hydra's head of drug smuggling, all you get is new ones from head to take his place. Jorge Chabat, a security analyst and counter-narcotics policies, states: "For years, the United States insisted, with the Government of Mexico, where the reason for the narcos kept their power was that the government dismantled gangs. Now the government is doing just that (...), and the narcos are more powerful than ever "43.

Mexico still has the opportunity to avoid following the tragic course of Colombia, but each time is running out. Washington should start paying more attention to the problem than it has done so far, and it is necessary that the U.S. authorities to develop better answers than ineffective and discredited policies of the past. If Washington continues its strategy of prohibition, violence and corruption that convulse to Colombia will become permanent key features and also from Mexico. Penetration of the illegal drug trade has already reached an unhealthy level in the economy and American society.

The stark reality is that prohibition simply pushed the trade underground product, thus generating a huge profit potential for black market that attracts criminal elements prone to violence. In weighing the possibility of maintaining or changing the strategy of drug prohibition, the U.S. and other countries should consider all the possible social costs. There is no doubt that drug abuse is a serious public health problem, and we are aware of its substantial social costs, but, as we have seen for decades in Colombia and other drug-producing countries, the prohibition of trade distortions generated economic and opportunity to consolidate some of the undesirable elements of society. The drug prohibition leads inevitably to an orgy of corruption and violence. This also represents a very real social cost, and this reality is becoming too evident in our southern neighbor.

The U.S. authorities must ask themselves if they want to risk the emergence of a "New Colombia", but this time in the same southern border. If the Bush administration does not want to face the conflict that would lead to a situation of these features, you must leave, and soon, his strategy of prohibition.

Notes

1. For a discussion of the policy in Ted Galen Carpenter, Bad Neighbor Policy: Washington's Futile War on Drugs in Latin America, New York, Palgrave / Macmillan, 2003.
2. Quoted in Jerry Seper, "Mexico Drug Fighter Ace doubted," Washington Times, March 9, 1999, p. A4.
3. Department of State U.S. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 2005, p. 188.
4. Quoted in Danna Harman, "Mexican Drug Cartels' Wars Move Closer to U.S. Border," USA Today , August 17, 2005.
5. Marco Aquino, "Interview-Mexican Cartels Muscle in on Peru Cocaine", Reuters, March 10, 2005.
6. Joseph Contreras, "Losing the Battle," Newsweek International, July 11, 2005.
7. Chris Kraul, "Official Says Mexican Tijuana, Gulf Cartels Have United", Los Angeles Times, January 14, 2005, Link
8. Mark Stevenson, "Drug Shootouts Kill 12 in Northern Mexico", Associated Press, February 15, 2005.
9. About the Zetas, see Tim Padgett, "The Killers Next Door: Brutal Drug Gangs Are Terrorizing the US-Mexico Border", Time, April 18, 2005, p. 140-41, Megan Basham, "Cartel Assassins," American Spectator, August 17, 2005, http://www.spectator.org/util/print.aspart_id=8599 and Mark Stevenson, "Elite Soldiers Desert, Switch Sides in Mexican Drug War, "Associated Press, October 12, 2003.
10. Mary Anastasia O'Grady, "Innocent Mexicans Bear Brunt of Drug Violence the" Wall Street Journal, 1 July 2005.
11. Harman.
12. Tim Gaynor, "Mexican Troops, Police Seize Federal Border Town," Reuters, June 13, 2005.
13. Mary Jordan and Kevin Sullivan, "Border Police Chief Only Latest Casualty In Mexico Drug War," Washington Post, June 16, 2005, p. A1.
14. John Authers, "Police Return to Mexico Frontier Town to Do Battle with Drug Cartels", Financial Times, July 30, 2005, p. 7.
15. Quoted in Harman.
16. "Violence Leads to Close U.S. Consulate," Associated Press, July 29, 2005.
17. Mark Stevenson, "27 Policemen Face Drug Charges Cancun," Associated Press, March 1, 2005.
18. Quoted in Mary Jordan and Kevin Sullivan, "Mexican Police Held in Killings, Drug Traffickers Suspected Work for," Washington Post, January 30, 2004, p. A11.
19. Carpenter, Bad Neighbor Policy, p. 182.
20. Harman.
21. Carpenter, Bad Neighbor Policy, p. 177.
22. Quoted in ibid., P. 178.
23. Jerry Seper, "Mexican Army Officers Found Guilty of Taking Bribes Drug," Washington Times, April 4, 2003, p. A4.
24. Jorge Luis Sierra Guzmán, "Mexico's Military in the War on Drugs", Drug War Monitor (Washington Office on Latin America), April 2003, p. 6.
25. Ginger Thompson and James C. McKinley Jr., "Mexico Drug Cartels Wage Fierce Battle for Their Turf," New York Times, January 13, 2005, p. A1, Kevin Sullivan and Mary Jordan, "The Gifts of a Mexican Drug Lord," Washington Post, June 10, 2004, John Rice, "Mexican Army Raids Top Security Prison to Prison Following Drug Report of Alliance", Associated Press, 14 January 2005, and Mary Jordan, "Mexican Drug Crackdown Undercut Prisoners," Washington Post, January 30, 2005, p. A23.
26. Harman.
27. David Luhnow, "Tensions Mount in Mexico's War on Drug Cartel", Wall Street Journal, January 24, 2005, p. A16, and Alistair Bell, "Mexico Steps Up Security for Fox after Cartel Scare," Reuters, February 7, 2005.
28. Mary Jordan, "Talk of Inquiry reignites Church's Drug Ties," Washington Post, 1 October 2003.
29. Quoted in "Bishop's Admission on Drug-Tainted Donations Causes Uproar," CNN.com
30. "Report: Mexico World's Kidnapping King", Associated Press, August 3, 2005.
31. Mary Jordan, "Americans Vanish in Mexican Town," Washington Post, January 22, 2005, p. A10, and Tim Gaynor, "Kidnappings Blight US-Mexico Border in Drug War", Reuters, 1 February 2005.
32. Ginger Thompson, "Mexico Rebukes U.S. for Drug Violence Alert," New York Times, January 28, 2005, p. A6.
33. Quoted in Harman.
34. Quoted in Basham.
35. U.S. Department of State, Bureau for Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, p. 189.
36. Alfredo Corchado, "Cartel Enforcers Operate in Dallas Trained by U.S. Army", Dallas Morning News, June 19, 2005, and Jerry Seper, "Mexican Mercenaries Expand Into U.S. Base," Washington Times, 1 August 2005.
37. John Authers, "Border Tension Rises Between U.S. and Mexico", Financial Times, August 18, 2005, p. 10.
38. Tim Gaynor, "Mexican Drug War Hurting Business along Texas Border," Reuters, January 25, 2005.
39. Estimates of the value of the drug trade in Mexico vary considerably. The minimum estimate is 4,000 million dollars annually. See Mary Anastasia O'Grady, OpinionJournal's Political Diary, August 30, 2005. The impressive maximum estimate is 250,000 million dollars. See Tim Weiner, "Mexico Links Drug Traffic with Police", New York Times, January 30, 2004, p. A9. If the latter estimate is correct, the value of the drug trade exceeds that of any legitimate industry in Mexico. The vast range of estimates emphasizes the difficulty of determining the value of a dark and illegal business.
40. For a discussion of the importance of the drug trade in Afghanistan's economy in Ted Galen Carpenter, "How the Drug War in Afghanistan Undermines America's War on Terror," Cato Institute Foreign Policy Briefing No. 84, November 10, 2004, p. 4-6.
41. Department of State U.S. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, p. 188, 189.
42. Ibid., P. 190.
43. Quoted in Brian Winter, "Fox Is Victim of Own Success in Mexico Drug War," Reuters, February 15, 2005.